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ENTERPRISE LIABILITY AND INSIDER TRADING
ALFRED F. CONARD*
I. PREFACE
In an inconspicuous clause of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA),' the securities industry won for itself
an immunity that will be the envy of other industries that are afflicted with
statutory liabilities for pollution, unsafe products, and other harms. In
private suits for violations of this Act, employers are not liable for offenses
of their employees if the employers acted in good faith and did not induce
the violations. 2 I will call this the rule of "rebuttable liability."
This novel provision rejected not only the rules of liability that most
federal courts had applied under the principal Securities Acts,3 but also a
centuries-old tradition of the common law of torts.4 It was, moreover, hard
to reconcile with Congress' professed purpose in enacting ITSFEA-to
provide "greater deterrence, detection and punishment of violations of
insider trading.'' 5
* Henry M. Butzel Professor Emeritus, University of Michigan Law School; Distin-
guished Visiting Scholar, Stetson University College of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges
the critical comments of Heidi Feldman, Stuart J. Kaswell, Louis Loss, Marleen O'Connor,
Mathias Reimann, Thomas L. Riesenberg, Steven G. Schulman, and Joel Seligman, none of
whom shares any responsibility for opinions expressed in the article. The author also acknowl-
edges the research assistance of Frederick L. Deming, Curt W. McCauley, and Garrett
Swartwood, and the production assistance of Eeva Joensuu.
1. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) [hereinafter ITSFEA].
2. ITSFEA added a new section 20A to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 78a-78kk (West 1981) [hereinafter Exchange Act]. The new section authorized a
new private right of suit but provided in § 20A(b)(3), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78t-l(b)(3) (West Supp.
1992), that employers should not be liable for offenses of employees in suits authorized by
the Exchange Act except as provided by § 20(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78t(a), of the original Exchange
Act. Section 78t(a) provided that a controlling person should be liable under the Exchange
Act to the same extent as a controlled person "unless the controlling person acted in good
faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or
cause of action." Exchange Act § 78t(a).
For an interpretation of § 20A(b)(3) that is contrary to the statement in the text, see
infra notes 187-93 and accompanying text. The interpretation stated above, however, has been
accepted by most commentators on the Exchange Act. See infra note 174.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 59-79. By "Securities Acts," I mean here and
elsewhere the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988), and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1988). 1 will refer to these Acts separately as the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act, respectively.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 14-19.
5. H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6043, 6044. See also ITSFEA § 2, stating:
The Congress finds that-
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Under traditional tort law, which most federal courts apply to liabilities
under the Securities Acts, employers are liable for the frauds of their
employees committed within the scope of their employment or authority
without regard to the guilt or innocence of their employers. 6 Federal court
decisions in the decades preceding adoption of the Securities Acts had
imposed liability on employers for their agents' frauds, even in cases that
a Restatement Reporter found extreme. 7 The governing principle has been
called "vicarious liability," 8 "respondeat superior," 9 and most recently
"enterprise liability."' 0
(1) the rules and regulations .. .governing trading while in possession of material,
nonpublic information are ... necessary and appropriate ...
(3) ... additional methods are appropriate to deter and prosecute violations ....
There was no Senate Report on the bill that became ITSFEA, but an intention to increase
deterrence of insider trading was avowed on the Senate floor, without dissent, by Senators
William Proxmire, Alfonse D'Amato, John Heinz and Jake Garn. 134 CONG. REc. S17,218-
20 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988).
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 257 (Misrepresentations; in General), 258
(Incidental Misrepresentation), 261 (Agent's Position Enables Him to Deceive), 262 (Agent
Acts for His Own Purposes) (1958).
7. See Kean v. National City Bank, 294 F. 214 (6th Cir. 1923) (involving bank officer's
role in selling stolen securities), cert. dismissed, 263 U.S. 729 (1924); National City Bank v.
Carter, 14 F.2d 940 (6th Cir. 1926) (involving bank officer who cooperated with swindlers);
Stewart v. Wright, 147 F. 321 (8th Cir.) (involving bank president and cashier aiding swindlers),
cert. denied, 203 U.S. 590 (1906). The Restatement Reporter, Warren Seavey, found these
results doubtful because of the remoteness of the connection between the bank officers'
deceptions and their duties to their banks. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, app. at 422-
23 (1958).
8. See THOMAS BATY, VICAmous LiABuxry (1916); William 0. Douglas, Vicarious
Liability and the Administration of Risk I, 38 YALE L.J. 584 (1929); Harold J. Laski, The
Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105 (1916).
9. See Warren A. Seavey, Speculations as to "Respondeat Superior," in HARVARW
LEGAL EssAYs 433 (1934), reprinted in WARREN A. SEAVEY, STDms iN AGENCY 129 (1949).
10. "Enterprise liability" seems to have appeared first as a synonym for "vicarious
liability" and "respondeat superior" in Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Vicarious Liability in the
Conflict of Laws-Toward A Theory of Enterprise Liability under "Foreseeable and Insurable
Laws". III, 69 YALE L.J. 978, 978 (1960), followed by C. Robert Morris, Jr., Enterprise
Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE. L.J. 554, 554
(1961), and Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise
and Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1345, 1345 (1982). I embrace "enterprise
liability" in preference to the older terms because it connotes the liability of a business
organization of which the employee or agent is a part, rather than the liability of another
distinct individual.
George L. Priest and some others have used "enterprise liability" to designate an extension
of the concept to embrace product liability, which does not depend on the fault of an employee,
but only on the imperfection of a product. See George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise
Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL
STuD. 461, 463 (1985); George L. Priest, Punitive Damages and Enterprise Liability, 56 S.
CAL. L. REv. 123, 123-25 (1982); Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance
Externality: An Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 129, 133
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ITSFEA's rejection of one of the axioms of tort law suggests a number
of questions. Is the rebuttable liability principle more suitable than enterprise
liability for insider trading offenses, or for securities frauds in general? If
so, is it preferable for torts in general? Or is it, on the other hand, a gift
to the securities industry that was slipped into ITSFEA without adequate
consideration or justification?
In approaching these questions, I will start by reviewing the triumph of
enterprise liability in Anglo-American tort law, and compare it with various
forms of rebuttable liability that exist in foreign law (Part II). I will then
review the rivalry between the two systems of liability in securities law that
flourished in federal courts until 1990 (Part III). This review will be followed
by an analysis of the commands and implications of ITSFEA (Part IV),
after which I will speculate on the consequences of the choice between the
two systems of liability (Part V). I will conclude with some guesses about
the next steps in the rivalry between these principles (Part VI).
I will not, however, revisit the perennial dispute between defenders and
denunciators of insider trading." Rather, I will address the means of
effectuating the policies against insider trading that have flourished in federal
courts since 1946 and have been emphatically endorsed by Congress in the
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA) 2 and the Insider Trading and
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA). 13
II. ENTERPRi siE LLBILrrY i OTHER CONTEXTS
A. The Prevalence of Enterprise Liability
The radical significance of excluding enterprise liability from suits on
account of insider trading gains perspective when viewed in the light of the
principle's conquest of other areas of tort law. Enterprise liability was
unknown to the sophisticated legal system of ancient Rome and to the
cruder system of medieval England. Under those regimes, employers were
n.16 (1991).
Christopher Stone and Guido Calabresi appear to have used the term to embrace both
kinds of liability. Christopher 0. Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of
Corporate Conduct, 90 YALE L.J. 1, 11-19 (1980); Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk
Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 500-01 (1961) [hereinafter Calabresi,
Thoughts]; Gutmo CMA.iAns, Tan COSTS OF Accmmrrs 50-58 (1970) [hereinafter CAt.aaEsI,
COSTS].
11. See James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the
"Chicago School," 1986 DuKE L.J. 628 (reviewing insider trading dispute); Dennnis W.
Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REv. 857, 861
(1983) (favoring freedom to trade unless restricted by contract); Roy A. Schotland, Unsafe at
Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REv. 1425,
1425-30 (1967) (opposing insider trading); HENRY G. MANE, IN sIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK
MAR=ET (1966) (defending insider trading as contributor to market efficiency).
12. Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984).
13. 102 Stat. at 4677.
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generally liable only for their personal misdeeds, as explained by Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., in his classic history of agency.' 4 But the common
law switched, about three centuries ago, to a principle that imposed liability
on employers for the torts of their employees and agents committed in the
course of their employment or authority, regardless of the employers' fault.15
The principle was applied to frauds as well as to physical injuries.' 6
The principle of enterprise liability was adopted very casually, with no
explanation beyond the aphorism or fiction that "the act of a servant is
the act of his master.' '17 When examined in the light of 19th century
rationalism, the principle appeared to Holmes to be opposed to common
sense,' 8 while others denounced it in stronger terms.' 9
Enterprise liability awakened an intuitive hostility when the "employer"
was visualized as an individual "master" employing a menial "servant," as
suggested by the archaic terminology of the digest title, "Master and
Servant," 20 and the Restatement of Agency.2' This perception is promoted
also by the terms "vicarious liability" 22 and "respondeat superior,"' which
imply that one individual is being assessed for the misdeeds of another, an
obvious perversion of natural justice.
Holmes' attack on enterprise liability was immediately challenged on
historical grounds24 and later on grounds of social welfare and economic
efficiency. 2 Some of the key criticisms were Harold Laski's observation
that employers would generally suffer less from paying damages than injury
victims would suffer from uncompensated injuries, 26 Young B. Smith's
explanation that employers can pass the costs of compensating accidents on
14. Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., Agency, 4 HARv. L. REv. 345 (1891); Oliver W. Holmes,
Jr., Agency, 5 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1891), reprinted in 3 SELECTED ESSAYS iN ANGLO-AmERiCAN
LEoAL HISTORY 368 (1909); cf. John H. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its
History-I, 7 HAgv. L. REV. 383 (1894), reprinted in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TORTS
41(1924).
15. See Holmes, supra note 14; Wigmore, supra note 14. The case most frequently cited
for signaling the switch to enterprise liability is Jones v. Hart, Holt K.B. 642, 90 Eng. Rep.
1255 (1698).
16. Hem v. Nichols, I Salk. 289, 91 Eng. Rep. 256; Holt 462, 90 Eng. Rep. 1154 (1708).
17. Jones, 90 Eng. Rep. at 1255.
18. Holmes, supra note 14, at 14, reprinted in 3 SELECTED ESSAYS at 404.
19. See BATY, supra note 8, at 7; Frank W. Hackett, Why is a Master Liable for the
Tort of His Servant, 7 HARv. L. REv. 107 (1893).
20. See 73 FPD 4th 455 (1992) (containing digest topic master and servant).
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 219.49 (1958).
22. See BATY, supra note 8.
23. See Seavey, supra note 9.
24. See Wigmore, supra note 14, at 404, reprinted in SELECTED ESSAYS at 62 n.
25. See Laski, supra note 8, at 121; Young B. Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 CoLUM. L.
REv. 444, 716 (1923); Douglas, supra note 8.
26. Laski, supra note 8, at 115-22. Laski authored this article in 1916, when he was a
lecturer at Harvard University. Later, he returned to England, where, among other activities,
he became Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Labour Party.
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to their customers, 27 and William 0. Douglas' reasoning that liability will
motivate employers to reduce and avoid injuries.'
In the second half of the twentieth century, scholars reinforced the
defense of enterprise liability on grounds of economic efficiency. 29 Among
other factors, they observed that employers can usually reduce accident
causes more efficiently than potential victims can, and that putting the cost
on employers tends to allocate resources away from accident-prone activi-
ties. 3
0
Enterprise liability prevailed also in many other parts of the Western
world, quite independently of the common law. The principle was adopted
in France in the course of the 18th century3' and'enshrined in the Code
Napoleon, 32 which was widely copied in other parts of the world.
3
B. Rebuttable Liability in Foreign Law
The idea that employers should be subject only to a prima facie liability
for their employees' torts, which would be rebuttable by proof of freedom
from personal fault, seems to have been unknown in the United States
before it was discovered as an interpretation of the Securities Acts. But it
has interesting parallels in foreign countries.
Some contemporary legal systems offer a principle which burdens em-
ployers with prima facie liability, from which they can escape by proving
that they exercised reasonable care to prevent the torts of their agents.Y
27. Smith, supra note 25, at 458. Smith later became Dean of the Columbia University
School of Law.
28. Douglas, supra note 8, at 587-88. Douglas, who published this article when he was
a professor at Yale University Law School, was later Chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission and a Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
29. See Calabresi, Thoughts, supra note 10; Kornhauser, supra note 10; Stone, supra
note 10.
30. See ROBERT CooTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND EcoNoMcs 407-08 (1987); STEVEN
SHAVELL, ECONomc ANALYSIS OF AccIDErr LAw 170-77 (1987). Shavell adhered to the old
term "vicarious liability" although justifying the principle by its effects on business organi-
zations. See also Wnn" M. LANDEs & RicARD A. POSNER, T-n EcoNoMIc STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW 120-21, 208.09 (1987) (adhering to "respondeat superior"); Hanson & Logue, supra
note 10, at 160-61.
A novel attack on enterprise liability on the ground that it burdens the economy with
the costs of punitive damages and "fails to reward effective compliance programs" was made
in Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability:
A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEo. L.J. 1559, 1563-69, 1645.(1990).
31. M. Marcel Planiol, Etudes sur la Responsabiit& Civile, 38 REv. CRIT. LEois. & JUR.
282 (1909).
32. (Fr.) C. civ., art. 1384 (1804).
33. See KONRAD ZWEiGOERT & HENg K6Tz, 2 INTRODUCTION TO CoMPARATIvE LAW 337-
39 (Tangweir trans., 2d rev. ed. 1987); Robert Neuner, Respondeat Superior in the Light of
Comparative Law, 4 LA. L. REV. 1 (1941); E. Fabre Surveyer, A Comparison of Delictual
Responsibility in Law in the Countries Governed by a Code, 8 TuL. L. REV. 53, 59-60, 63-66
(1933).
34. See ZwEiGERT & K6rz, supra note 33, at 324-30; Neuner, supra note 33, at 2-8.
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Convenient examples may be found in the laws of Germany3" and Puerto
Rico .
6
But these provisions impose much heavier burdens on employers than
does ITSFEA. The employer does not escape liability merely by proving
the good faith and noninducement that satisfy the Exchange Act.37 In the
German formulation, the employer must show that it observed the care
required in the trade in providing contrivances and utensils and in directing
performance of the activity.3 The Puerto Rican version, typical of many
derived from Spanish law, requires that the employer "employed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to preclude the damage.
' 39
Moreover, courts of the countries that adopted the German or Spanish
formulation have tended to interpret the care requirements so rigorously
that the results were similar to those under the enterprise liability principle
35. (Ger.) BGB § 831, para. 1 (1896); (Ger.) Civ. CoDE § 831, para. 1 (Walter Loewy
trans., 1909). In the Loewy translation the section reads as follows:
One who employs another to do an act, is bound to render indemnity for the injury
which the employee in the performance of the act causes to a third person. The
obligation for indemnity does not occur, if the employer in the selection of the
employed person, and so far as he has to provide contrivances or utensils or has to
direct the performance of the act, observes, in the providing or directing, the care
required in trade or if the injury would also have occurred if such care had been
observed.
36. P.R. Crv. CODE § 5142, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 5142 (1968). The text of the
section reads as follows:
The obligation imposed by the preceeding section [5141 of this title] is demandable,
not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for
whom they should be responsible.
The father, and, in the event of his death or incapacitation, the mother, is liable
for the damage caused by the minor children living with them.
Guardians are liable for the damages caused by minors or incapacitated persons who
are under their authority and live with them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are likewise liable for any
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter
are employed or on account of their duties.
The Commonwealth is liable in this sense under the same circumstances and con-
ditions as those under which a private citizen would be liable.
Finally, masters or directors of arts and trades are liable for the damages caused by
their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.
The liability referred to in this section shall cease when the liable persons mentioned
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
preclude the damage.
Section 5141, referred to in the first paragraph of section 5142, is a general tort liability
section, providing in its first sentence as follows:
A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another through fault or
negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
37. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1988). Rebuttal of liability under the Securities Act, which
is not involved in insider trading, requires proof that "the controlling person had no knowledge
of or reason to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the
controlled person is alleged to exist." Securities Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 78o.
38. See supra note 35.
39. See supra note 36.
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of British, American, and French law.40 In the 1980s, the German Ministry
of Justice proposed a revision to the German Civil Code to replace rebuttable
liability with enterprise liability. 41 Leading German scholars, after surveying
laws of the Western world on the liability of employers, applauded the
Ministry's proposal.
42
In light of these comparisons, the conditions of employer exoneration
authorized by ITSFEA appear to be more lenient than those of any modern
legal system-foreign or domestic.
III. REBuTTABLE Lmrr y BEFORE ITSFEA
A. The Words of Congress
The conception of rebuttable liability was introduced in the Securities
Acts of 1933 and 1934 by provisions that make persons who "control"
others liable for violations of the Acts by controlled persons unless the
controllers are innocent of specified elements of the violations. Under the
Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act), the controller was excused from
liability if it had no knowlege or reason to know of the falsity that
constituted the violation. 43 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act), the controller was exonerated if it acted in good faith and
did not induce the controlee's violation."
These provisions were not adopted in contemplation of the liability of
employers, which was not even in the lawmakers' consciousness. 4  The
liabilities of broker-dealers, which eventually became the principal subjects
40. ZWEIGERT & K6rz, supra note 33, at 327-28.
41. Id. at 330.
42. Id. at 339.
43. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o. I use "controller" as an abbreviation of "controlling person,"
and "it" as a relative pronoun in lieu of "he, she, or it" because most of the controllers
involved in this article are corporations rather than individuals.
44. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a-78kk (West 1981). I use "controlee" as an abbreviation of
"controlled person."
45. This fact was noticed and documented in Kenneth I. Levin, Comment, The Con-
trolling Persons Provisions: Conduits of Secondary Liability Under Federal Securities Law, 19
V'L. L. REv. 621 (1974). It was overlooked by most of the commentators on the conflict
between enterprise and rebuttable liability, who consequently puzzled over the means of
reconciling the common law principle with the control clauses. See William J. Fitzpatrick &
Ronald T. Carman, Respondeat Superior and the Federal Securities Laws: A Round Peg in a
Square Hole, 12 HoFsiRA L. REv. 1 (1983); Carol M. Lynch, Note, Rule lOb-5-The Equivalent
Scope of Liability Under Respondeat Superior and Section 20(a)-Imposing a Benefit Require-
ment on Apparent Authority, 35 VA'D. L. RiEv. 1383 (1982); Steven R. Reininger, Exclusive
or Concurrent-The Role of Control and Respondeat Superior in the Imposition of Vicarious
Civil Liability on Broker-Dealers, 9 SEc. REo. L.J. 226 (1981); Comment, Secondary Liability
of Controlling Persons Under the Securities Acts: Toward an Improved Analysis, 126 U. PA.
L. REv. 1345 (1978); Note, The "Controlling Persons" Liability of Broker-Dealers for Their
Employees' Federal Securities Violations, 1974 DuKE L.J. 824; Note, The Burden of Control:
Derivative Liability Under Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1019 (1973).
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of enterprise liability, were not addressed by Congress until 1936, when
provisions for the registration of broker-dealers and their representatives
were added to the Exchange Act.46 The idea that the "controlling persons"
affected by the rebuttable liability clauses embraced employers did not
surface until more than three decades after the clauses' enactment. 47
The "controlling persons" on whom the legislators intended to impose
liability were not the corporations that might control employees, but the
officers, financiers, or shareholders (including holding companies) that might
control corporations. In the Securities Act, the persons specifically contem-
plated were those who controlled corporations through "dummy direc-
tors." 48 In the Exchange Act, the contemplated subjects were more broadly
described as those who controlled corporations through "stock ownership,
lease, contract, and agency." 49
Under the common law that preceded the Securities Acts, these con-
trolling persons bore no responsibility for the frauds of the corporations
and the corporation agents that they controlled unless they participated
personally in the frauds, or conducted their corporations' affairs with such
46. See Act of May 27, 1936, § 3, 49 Stat. 1377 (1936) (adding subsections (b), (c), and
(d) to § 15 (15 U.S.C. § 78o) of Exchange Act).
47. See infra text accompanying notes 59-69.
48. S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1933), reprinted in J. S. ELLENBARGER &
ELLEN P. MAHAR, 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURinS
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, item 17 (1973); H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (Conference
Report) 27, 77 CONG. REc. 3902 (1933), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, item 19.
49. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 48, item 18. The types of control contemplated are revealed by the
following paragraph, contained in the section-by-section analysis of the section (then numbered
19) that became subsection 20(a) of the Exchange Act:
It would be difficult if not impossible to enumerate or to anticipate the many ways
in which actual control may be exerted. See Handy & Harmon v. Burnet, 284 U.S.
1336 (1931). A few examples of the methods used are stock ownership, lease,
contract, and agency. It is well known that actual control sometimes may be exerted
through ownership of much less than a majority of the stock of a orporation either
by the ownership of such stock alone or through such ownership in combination
with other factors.
The case of Handy & Harmon v. Burnet, 284 U.S. 1336 (1931), cited by the committee,
involved control of a corporation in relation to an internal revenue regulation on consolidated
tax returns.
Further evidence of the type of control that concerned legislators is contained in a 1934
report of a Senate investigation of abuses in the securities industry which observed:
Among the most vicious practices unearthed at the hearings before the subcommittee
was the flagrant betrayal of their fiduciary duties by directors and officers of
corporations who used their positions of trust and the confidential information which
came to them in such positions, to aid them in their market activities. Closely allied
to this type of abuse was the unscrupulous employment of inside information by
large stockholders who, while not directors and offices, exercised sufficient control
over the destinies of their companies to enable them to acquire and profit by
information not available to others.
SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICES, S. RaP. No. 1455,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934), reprinted in LEGIsLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 48, item 21.
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gross irregularity that courts would "pierce the veil" of corporate entity.50
But irregularity in corporate procedures was easily avoided by well counseled
managers, and evidence of personal participation was hard to uncover. In
order to facilitate proof of participation by controllers in the frauds of
their corporations, the legislators of 1933 and 1934 imposed liability on
controllers for the frauds of controlees unless the controllers proved the
existence of the exonerating elements listed in the Securities Acts.
But the liability of employers, unlike that of officers, directors, and
shareholders, had long been established in both state and federal courts.5
If legislators or their scriveners gave any thought to the liability of employers
for securities frauds, they would naturally have expected courts to apply
enterprise liability to securities frauds as courts had done in other fraud
cases.52 Their assumption would have been verified by the rulings of most
federal courts in the first thirty-odd years of the Securities Acts, when
courts routinely imposed enterprise liability on employers for employees'
violations of securities laws.
5 3
The words of Congress should, of course, be read not only with a view
to legislators' specific intentions, but also to "avoid irrationality" and
"promot[e] consistency and coherence"'' or to achieve "comprehensive
rationality. ' '55 In this vein, some of the judicial opinions that rejected
enterprise liability argued that making employers liable would clash with a
consistent pattern of fault-based liability. 6 But this observation ignored the
Securities Acts' imposition of liability on an issuer when a registration
statement was materially false, even if no one, not even an employee, was
at fault.
57
50. For recent commentaries on disregarding the corporate entity, see Robert Charles
Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARv. L. REv. 505 (1977);
Henry Hansmann & Reinler Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate
Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991); Christopher D. Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in
the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 YALE L.J. 1 (1980). For classic expositions, see ELVIN
R. LArY, SuBSmr.muS AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS (1936); Adolf A. Berle, The Theory
of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 343 (1947); Elvin R. Latty, The Corporate Entity as
a Solvent of Legal Problems, 34 MIcH. L. REv. 597 (1936); I. Maurice Wormser, Piercing the
Veil of Corporate Entity, 12 COLuM. L. REv. 496 (1912).
51. See sources cited supra note 6.
52. See sources cited supra note 7.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 58-64. The first departure from imposing enterprise
liability was Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1967).
54. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REV.
407, 464, 479, 482 (1989); cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Supreme Court Statutory
Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 373-74 (1991).
55. See Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the
Writing and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 5 (1991).
56. See Haynes v. Anderson & Strudwick, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1303, 1307-14 (E.D. Va.
1981); Jackson v. Bache & Co., 381 F. Supp. 71, 95 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
57. Securities Act § 11(a)-(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)-(b) (1988). The due diligence defenses
of subsection (b) do not apply to the issuer, which is made liable by subsection (a).
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B. Court Rulings Under the 1933 and 1934 Acts
1. The first wave: enterprise liability assumed
For a quarter of a century after the courts discovered Rule lOb-558 as
a basis of private suits for fraud, most of them casually imposed liabilities
on firms for the frauds of agents without any reference to the presumptive
liability clauses. This practice appeared in Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co., 9 which in 1946 launched the lOb-5 explosion, as well as in other early
decisions. 60
The courts in these cases were presumably applying common-law enter-
prise liability, since they made no mention of the rebuttable liability clauses.
But they would probably have reached the same results in most of these
cases if they had consciously applied the rules of rebuttable liability. The
facts of the cases suggest that high executives of the defendant corporations
induced the transactions. In Speed v. Transamerica Corp.,61 for instance,
the existence of fraud depended on the intentions of A. P. Gianinni, the
chief executive of Transamerica; if he had guilty knowedge, so did Tran-
samerica.6
2
In 1972, however, the Supreme Court clearly invoked the enterprise
liability principle to impose liability on a defendant bank.63 The opinion of
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which the Supreme Court affirmed,
had observed that "these employees as far as the plaintiffs were concerned
were apparently acting within their authority. Thus the bank did become
liable for any violation of the Regulation lOb-5." 64 Affirming on this point,
the Supreme Court observed laconically, "The liability of the bank, of
course, is coextensive with that of Gale and Haslem." 6 Neither counsel nor
court seems to have considered the possibility that the Exchange Act's
presumptive liability clause had any bearing on the case.6
Five years earlier, the assumption that enterprise liability applied to
securities liabilities had been challenged by a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
58. Rule lOb-5 under the Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1991).
59. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
60. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946); Hawkins v.
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Ark. 1949); Fischman v.
Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369
(3d Cir. 1956).
61. 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
62. See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 821 (D. Del. 1951) (declaring
that deception "must be based on the state of mind of Giannini").
63. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
64. Reyos v. United States, 431 F.2d 1337, 1347 (10th Cir. 1970) (emphasis added), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
65. Affiliated Ute Citizens, 406 U.S. at 154.
66. Similarly, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d
617, 623 (5th Cir. 1973), invoked the Restatement of Agency to impose liability on a brokerage
house without discussing the relevance of the presumptive liability clause.
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dictum that agency principles have no application to liabilities under the
federal securities acts. 67 This conclusion was promptly repudiated by a district
court and the Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit.6 8 The argument
against enterprise liability seems to have been overlooked by counsel in
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,69 but was routinely raised by most
corporate defendants in later years.7 0
2. The triumph of enterprise liability
The first judicial opinion to reexamine enterprise liability in light of the
argument for rebuttability was delivered in 1968,71 just one year after
enterprise liability had been casually rejected by the Ninth Circuit.7 2 On
examining the legislative history of the Securities Acts, the district judge
found no evidence of Congressional intention to limit liability and an
apparent disposition to increase it.7 Moreover, he doubted that the rebutt-
able liability clause was intended to apply to employers at all; it was
probably directed at major shareholders and officers who control corpora-
tions.7 4 On the level of social policy, the judge declared that excluding
agency principles "would in effect give blessing to a hear-no-evil, see-no-
evil approach by partners of a brokerage house which is hardly in keeping
with the remedial purposes of the '33 Act . . ,,"- The judge concluded by
holding the brokerage firm liable on agency principles for the fraud of its
agent. His opinion on this point was expressly approved by the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals7 6 and reaffirmed by it several years later.7
Later decisions in the First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits
reached the same conclusion as the Fourth,7 8 usually after a briefer exami-
67. See Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689, 696 (9th Cir. 1967).
68. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 297 F. Supp. 1165, 1210-12 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970).
69. 406 U.S. 128 (1972). The Affilated Ute Citizens Court was focused on other issues,
including the scope of the duty to disclose, which had not previously been addressed by the
Court and the sovereign immunity of the United States. On the latter question, Justice Douglas
dissented from the majority's view that the government had not waived its immunity. Id. at
157.'
70. See infra notes 71-81, 91-100 and accompanying text; see also sources cited supra
note 45.
71. Johns Hopkins, 297 F. Supp. at 1208.09.
72. See Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689, 696 (9th Cir. 1967)
(rejecting enterprise liability).
73. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 297 F. Supp. 1165, 1211-12 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970).
74. Id. -
75. Id. at 1212.
76. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1128 (4th Cir. 1970).
77. Carras v. Bums, 516 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1975).
78. In re Atlantic Fin. Management, Inc., 784 F.2d 29 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1072 (1987); Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir.
1980); Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1011 (1980); Holloway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690, 695 (6th Cir. 1976); Fey v. Walston
& Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1051-53 (7th Cir. 1974); SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981, 986-87
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972).
1992]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:913
nation of authorities.79 The argument most relied on was the absence of
any indication of legislative intention to limit the liabilities that would
normally be imposed by the law of torts. In 1990 the Ninth Circuit joined
the majority,80 but not before its rejection of enterprise liability had spread
to other circuits. 8'
The Fourth Circuit, however, bypassed enterprise liability in a 1979
decision which mysteriously omitted any mention of it. 2 It examined liability
only under the rebuttability clause, and found that the defendant brokerage
firm had borne the burden of proving good faith and noninducement. This
pretermission led a district judge of the same circuit to reexamine the
relative merits of enterprise liability and rebuttable liability and to reject
the ruling which his own Court of Appeals had approved nine years earlier.8a
The opinions reviewed in the foregoing paragraphs involved private
suits for damages. When the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
was the plaintiff in an enforcement proceeding, some of the courts that had
applied enterprise liability to private suits declined to apply it to suits by
the Commission. The Sixth Circuit refused to apply enterprise liability in
an SEC enforcement proceeding on the ground that the common law
principle of enterprise liability applied to private suits, not to governmental
enforcement actions. 4
An opposite view was adopted by one decision of the Second Circuit.8'
Its dominant consideration was evidence that the rebuttable liability clauses
79. Fey, 443 F.2d at 1052-53. The Fey Court added the argument that the United States
Supreme Court had affirmed the application of agency principles in Affiliated Ute Citizens,
406 U.S. 128, 154 (1972). The Marbury Management court reexamined the legislative history
and other considerations and employed the same reasoning as the court in Johns Hopkins
Univ. v. Hutton, 297 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 422 F.2d
1124 (4th Cir. 1970).
80. Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1569 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1621 (1991). The same principle that was applied by Hollinger to brokers and their
reps was extended to nonbroker corporations and their employees in In re Network Equip.
Technologies, Inc., 762 F. Supp. 1359 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
81. See infra text accompanying notes 100-03.
82. Carpenter v. Harris, Upham & Co., 594 F.2d 388 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
868 (1979).
83. Haynes v. Anderson & Strudwick, 508 F. Supp. 1303, 1307-14 (E.D. Va. 1981)
(repudiating Johns Hopkins decision). The repudiation may have been inspired not only by
the appellate court's pretermission in Carpenter but also by the hostility toward broad
applications of the securities laws which Supreme Court Justices had shown in Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), and other cases. See Alfred F. Conard,
Securities Regulation in the Burger Court, 56 U. CoLo. L. REv. 193 (1985).
84. SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1318 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908
(1975).
85. SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975). Two earlier
district court decisions in the same circuit had applied the presumptive liability rule to a
corporation in an enforcement proceeding. One of them, SEC v. Micro-Moisture Controls,
Inc., 148 F. Supp. 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), did not even discuss the applicability of enterprise
liability. The other decision, SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), discussed
enterprise liability, and concluded that it had been superseded by the rebuttable liability clauses.
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were not intended to govern the liability of employers but the liability of
the controllers of corporations. Consequently, these clauses could not have
been intended to exclude common-law principles of agency. 86 The court did
not discuss the question whether common-law agency principles apply in
the same way to enforcement actions filed by government agencies, a
question on which there is little, if any, common law. But a subsequent
decision of the Second Circuit restricted the significance of agency principles
in enforcement actions by holding that injunctions should issue only to
restrain violations committed or approved by high executives; a firm should
not be subjected to a sanction for the fault of a single employee.
87
Common-law agency principles, including enterprise liability, arose in
the context of private suits and are generally framed in that context. 8
Whether the rules that have grown up in civil suits should be applied without
modification to criminal prosecutions is disputed. The federal courts appear
to restrict derivative liability in criminal prosecutions to intentional acts of
supervisory personnel who are vested with discretionary authority. 9 Whether
Id. at 1061-63. The decision did not discuss any possible difference between the rules of
liability applicable to enforcement proceedings and those applicable to private suits.
86. Management Dynamics, 515 F.2d at 812.
87. SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 54-56 (2d Cir. 1976).
88. See REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY (1958) (containing illustrative hypotheticals,
all of which are in terms of private suits, distributed throughout). See also Holmes, supra
note 14.
89. See United States v. Carter, 311 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1963); Continental Baking Co.
v. United States, 281 F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1960); New York Cent. and Hudson River R.R. v.
United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909). The Continental opinion, which was followed by Carter,
stated the basic precondition of corporate liability in these terms: "There is an officer or agent
of a corporation with broad express authority, generally holding a position of some respon-
sibility, who performs a criminal act related to the corporate principal's business." 281 F.2d
at 149. The Model Penal Code restated the principle as follows: "(c) the commission of the
offense was authorized, requested, commanded, performed or recklessly tolerated by the board
of directors or by a high managerial agent acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope
of his office or employment." MODEL PENAL CODE & CooNsNTAxRs § 2.07(l)(c) (1985). The
accompanying commentary declared, "The limitations on corporate liability imposed in cases
falling within Subsection (1)(c) are generally consistent with the position of the English courts,
the federal courts, and those of many American states." 1 PENAL CODE 340.
The Model Penal Code also imposed a prima facie liability on corporations for acts of
employees at any level for violations of statutes that reveal "a legislative purpose to impose
liability on corporations" Id. § 2.07(a)(1). This characterization seems to include the Securities
Acts. This prima facie liability is subject to rebuttal under § 2.07(5), which provides,
it shall be a defense if the defendant proves by a preponderance of evidence that'
the high managerial agent having supervisory responsibility over the subject matter
of the offense employed due diligence to prevent its commission.
The commentary on this subsection characterized it as "an important contribution to the
rationalization of corporate criminal responsibility," with parallels in a few state statutes, but
does not indicate that it has any basis in state or federal case law. 1 PENAL CODE 346.
Courts sometimes state the principle without limiting it to acts of supervisory employees
when the status of the guilty employee is not in question. See United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d
800. 822-23 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (involving case where level of employees involved does not appear);
United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1979) (involving case where guilty
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enforcement proceedings pursued by the SEC, commonly called "civil
actions," should employ the enterprise liability of private suits or the
restricted derivative liability of criminal prosecutions remains debatable.
3. The transitory rejection of enterprise liability
a. The exclusivity theory
While most of the federal courts were applying enterprise liability to
securities frauds, a small minority rejected it on the ground that the
rebuttable liability clauses provided the exclusive bases on which employers
could be held liable for their employees' violations of the Securities Acts.
The first judicial rejection of enterprise liability in a private suit appeared
in an obiter dictum pronounced by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
without a word of analysis.90 After the dictum had been contradicted by
district and appellate judges of the Fourth Circuit9' and ignored by. the
United States Supreme Court,92 a district judge in the Ninth Circuit produced
an elaborate rationalization.9 a Although the judge noted that rebuttability
employee was senior corporate officer of branch at which violations occurred).
Some writers on corporate criminal liability have asserted that a majority of state courts
apply respondeat superior to corporations in criminal cases by the same criteria as in private
suits. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Rethinking Corporate Liability Under the Model Penal Code,
19 RUTGERS L.J. 593 (1988); Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate
Behavior through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARv. L. REv. 1227 (1979). The number of cases
cited is too small to indicate an imposing weight of authority. See also John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction
in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REv. 193, 213-15 (1991).
90. Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1967). The major
portion of the opinion was devoted to liability for common-law fraud and rejected this liability
because the individual malefactor had no apparent authority to commit the fraud. Id. at 696.
On turning to liability under the Exchange Act, the court first found that the defendant had
borne the burden of proving innocence, and then added that the defendant could not be liable
under the Exchange Act on agency principles because these principles were inapplicable to
Exchange Act liabilities. Id. at 697. But if the court had applied agency principles, it would
have had to rule for the defendant under the Exchange Act as it had already done under
common law fraud. This aspect of Kamen was noted in Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 247
F. Supp. 1165, 1210-11 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir.
1970), and in some other decisions affirming concurrent liability.
Another 1967 case that is sometimes cited for the rejection of enterprise liability is Myzel
v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968). See Jackson v.
Bache & Co., 381 F. Supp. 71, 94 (N.D. Cal. 1974). This, however, is a misreading. Although
the Myzel court declared that the defendant's liability was not governed by agency principles,
it did not even hint that agency principles were inapplicable under the Exchange Act, and
even cited them as relevant to interpreting the presumptive liability clause. 386 F.2d at 738.
The statement that the defendant's liability was not governed by agency principles was probably
based on the view that the malefactor, although a controlled person, was not an agent.
91. See Johns Hopkins, 247 F. Supp. at 1210-12.
92. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
93. Jackson, 381 F. Supp. at 94. This rationalization had appeared earlier in SEC v.
Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), an SEC enforcement proceeding, in which
the court did not discuss any possible difference between liability in an enforcement proceeding
and in a private suit.
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had been rejected by the Fourth Circuit 94 and ignored by the Fifth,95 he
found wisps of support for it in earlier cases from other circuits as well as
his own circuit, 96 but relied more heavily on policies articulated in the
Exchange Act itself.
The judge reasoned that the rebuttable liability clause of the Exchange
Act constituted a comprehensive scheme of secondary liability, which was
broader than agency principles in basing liability on control alone without
other elements of agency, but narrower in allowing the controller to escape
liability by showing lack of complicity. 9 It was incompatible with enterprise
liability, which was impliedly excluded. Furthermore, he argued that the
Securities Act, which was in pari materia with the Exchange Act, rejected
"insurer's liability" by its reasonable investigation and reasonable care
clauses. 98
A similar analysis was embraced in the following year by the Ninth
Circuit in a case involving a newspaper's financial columnist,99 and in 1982
by the Third Circuit in a case involving a corporation's liability for insider
trading by the firm's president for his own account. °° Several years later,
a Fourth Circuit decision applied rebuttable liability to an employer' 0'
without even discussing its own contrary decisions, 02 and a district judge
of the Fourth Circuit felt free to adopt the views of the Third and Ninth
Circuits. 03
94. Jackson, 381 F. Supp. at 94 (citing Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124
(4th Cir. 1970)).
95. Id. (citing Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1973)).
96. The court erroneously characterized Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968), as holding that agency principles are inapplicable. See supra
note 90. The court also cited Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973), SEC v.
Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), and Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar &
Co., 382 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1967):Lanza did not involve the derivative liability of an employer,
but the primary liability of a director for approving a merger without full disclosure. Lum's
did not involve a private suit, but an SEC enforcement action. On Kamen, see supra note 90.
97. Jackson, 381 F. Supp. at 95.
98. Id at 95 (citing S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 and H.R. REP. No. 1383,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5). These Reports discussed provisions which eventually became Securities
Act § 11(a) and (b). See supra note 57. The court passed over the fact that the law as
eventually enacted imposed unconditional liability on the issuer even if the officers acted with
due diligence. See Securities Act § 11(b) pmbl. (stating that defenses of due diligence applies
to persons other than issuer).
99. Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975).
The Ninth Circuit later affirmed a decision that the columnist was individually liable. Zweig
v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979).
100. Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975). The court ignored the
possibility of exonerating the officers and directors on the ground that their trading in shares
was outside the scope of their duties as officers and directors.
101. Carpenter v. Harris, Upham & Co., 594 F.2d 388 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
868 (1979).
102. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970); Carras v. Bums,
516 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1975).
103. Haynes v. Anderson & Strudwick, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1303 (E.D. Va. 1981) (relying
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The recurrent rejection of traditional enterprise liability by some judges
is not adequately explained by the faint indications of discordant legislative
intentions. Like other judicial inclinations, the hostility toward enterprise
liability is probably motivated by imperfectly articulated perceptions that
something is vaguely wrong with imposing liability under the circumstances
presented. Two probable sources of such intimations invite mention.
b. The "injustice" of liability without fault
One explanation of some judges' impulsive rejection of enterprise lia-
bility is probably a perception that it is unjust to impose liability on
employers who are not personally at fault.104 This perception underlay the
classic attack on agency principles launched by Holmes a century ago.
Twentieth century critics attacked this analysis by arguing that the cost
of liability is not borne by innocent "masters," as the attackers supposed,
but is distributed among the consumers, investors, employees and others
who are affected by the employing enterprise. Insofar as the cost is distrib-
uted to consumers, it makes them pay the full cost of the goods and services
they consume and reduces their demands for harmful products and activi-
ties.1 05
This analysis rests on the assumption that the liabilities result from
causes that are recurrent and can be reflected in later prices. Its validity is.
obvious in relation to the accidents of truck drivers. If, however, one thinks
of torts that seem too outrageous to happen often, such as an employee's
shooting a passer-by on the street, the analysis is less persuasive.
It seems likely that judges' rejection of enterprise liability in early cases
under Rule lOb-5 was motivated in part by a perception of the newly
discovered offense of insider trading as an outrageous deviation from the
expectable that should not be figured into the cost of doing business. The
very idea that trading on inside information is criminal was startling, because
information from "inside" the company seems' like the most reliable and
legitimate kind of information. It was not until the enactment of the Insider
Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 that Congress defined the offense as trading
"while in possession of material, nonpublic information," which I abbre-
viate as "NPI trading."0 6
on Carpenter). Carpenter had held, without mentioning agency principles, that a broker escaped
liability by proving good faith under the presumptive liability clause. Carpenter, 599 F.2d at
394.
104. See Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 45. These coauthors were General Counsel
and Associate General Counsel, respectively, of the Securities Industry Association, which
consists largely of employers.
105. CALAB.Rsi, CosTs, supra note 10, at 73; COOTER & ULEN, supra note 30, at 407-08;
SHAVELL, supra note 30, at 170-72; LANDES & POSNER, supra note 30, at 120-21, 208-09.
106. The abuse of unpublished information is widely known as "insider trading," a term
that gained its initial currency as a description of trading on information emanating from
"inside" the issuer of the securities traded, like news of the lucky strike of ore in SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Later
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c. The litigation explosion
Another likely contributor to judges' hostility toward enterprise liability
in securities cases was their revulsion from a flood of suits on unfamiliar
principles based on the SEC's Rule lOb-5.!0 7 It is probably more than a
coincidence that the exclusivity theory was elaborated after SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co. log had revealed the broad potential of liability under the
rule, and Affiliated Ute Citizens'09 had confirmed the implication of a
private right of suit.
One likely basis of judicial revulsion from liability for NPI trading was
the boldness of the implication of a private right of suit from a statutory
section which expressed only an intention to criminalize violations of SEC
rules." 0 Even before Texas Gulf Sulphur, David Ruder, later an SEC
Chairman, had protested against the implication."' Later, Justice Rehnquist
referred to it caustically in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drugstores."2 In
1991, even after Congress had confirmed its approval of private rights of
suit for insider trading,"' Justice Scalia twice denounced the implication of
private rights of suit under the Securities Acts."
4
Although federal judges were bound by Supreme Court decisions to
recognize the private right of suit, they could limit its consequences by
refusing to apply in lOb-5 suits some of the principles of liability that are
usually used in other tort cases. A disposition to do so was articulated by
Justice Scalia, some years later, in these terms:
cases extended the prohibition of the Rule to information emanating from outside the company,
such as news of an impending takeover bid. See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12
(2d Cir. 1981); Felt v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y.
1971), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983). For these cases, a new term is more appropriate.
The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1264, and ITSFEA, 102 Stat. 4077, gave
official sanction to the term "nonpublic information," which I have abbreviated in the term
"NPI trading."
The liabilities under ITSFEA are specifically applicable to persons who communicate
unpublished information to traders. Exchange Act §§ 20A(c) and 21A(a), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78t-
1(c), 78u-l(a) (West Supp. 1992). Although this practice is often distinguished as "tipping,"
in the interest of brevity I use the term "trading" to include "tipping."
107. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1991).
108. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
109. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
110. Rule lOb-5 was promulgated pursuant to Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j
(1988), which made violations "unlawful," but said nothing about private suits.
111. See David S. Ruder, Civil Liability under Rule lob-5: Judicial Revision of the
Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U. L. Rnv. 627 (1963).
112. 421 U.S. 723, 731-36 (1975).
113. See Exchange Act § 20A(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78t-l(a) (granting express private action);
§ 20A(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(d) (confirming existing implied rights of action).
114. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, Ill S. Ct. 2773, 2783
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); Virginia Bankshares Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749, 2767
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
In contrast to Justice Scalia's view of the intent of Exchange Act § 10(b), see Steve Thel,
The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REv.
385 (1990) (arguing that Congress intended to give SEC plenary power over stock markets).
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I recognize that the Court's disallowance ... of an action for
misrepresentation of belief is entirely contrary to the modern law
of torts, as authorities cited by the Court make plain.... I have
no problem with departing from modern tort law in this regard,
because I think the federal cause of action at issue here was never
enacted by Congress, ... and hence the more narrow we make it
(within the bounds of rationality) the more faithful we are to our
task." 5
Conservative judges in early lOb-5 cases could well have been startled
not only by myriads of investors to which brokerage firms might become
liable by reason of imperfect disclosures by their agents but also by the
immensity of the possible liabilities." 6 The Texas Gulf Sulphur executives
who first concealed a lucky strike and then issued a misleading statement
about it might conceivably be liable to thousands of investors who sold
shares in ignorance of the company's bright prospects." 7 Merrill Lynch,
one of whose representatives tipped a favored client, could imaginably be
liable to thousands of other investors."' Class suits could impose immense
costs of defense on issuers, dealers, and ultimately investors, with small
returns to individual fraud victims. The Exchange Act contained no statutory
cap on damages like the one that Congress attached to the new private
right of suit created by ITSFEA." 9
If the private right of suit against NPI traders was dubiously legitimate
in the eyes of these judges, the liability of employers of NPI traders may
have seemed even more questionable. In many of the cases that confronted
these judges, the NPI traders were operating for the benefit of themselves
or their confederates in flagrant conflict with the interests of their employers.
This was true of the geologist and the lawyer of Texas Gulf Sulphur, who
entered the market while their employer was witholding information pending
a planned press release. 20
115. Virginia Bankshares, I11 S. Ct. at 27 (Scalia, J., concurring).
116. See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 170 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting danger
of "Draconian, exorbitant damages").
117. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 881-86 (2d Cir. 1968) (Moore,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
118. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.
1974).
119. See Exchange Act § 20A(b)(1)-(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(b)(l)-(2), added by ITSFEA,
102 Stat. 4677. The text of these paragraphs is the following:
(1) The total amount of damages imposed under subsection (a) of this section shall
not exceed the profit gained or loss avoided in the transaction or transactions that
are the subject of the violation.
(2) The total amount of damages imposed against any person under subsection (a)
of this section shall be diminished by the amounts, if any, that such person may be
required to disgorge, pursuant to a court order obtained at the instance of the
Commission, in a proceeding brought under section 21u(d) [15 U.S.C. 78u(d)] of
this title relating to the same transaction or transactions.
120. See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 840, 853.
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In an overgeneralization from a case of this type, one federal judge
observed that "a corporate insider necessarily exceeds the scope of his
employment when he trades on the basis of material, nonpublic informa-
tion." 21
Although enterprise liability in cases of this sort could be defeated by
proving that 'the employee was on a "frolic," there would be no need to
put the employer to the test if, as the judge asserted, a corporate insider
"necessarily exceeds the scope of his employment."'' 2
d. The retreat from rebuttability
The negative reactions of some judges toward suits for NPI trading
were belied by subsequent events. The apprehension that the implication of
a private right of suit betrayed congressional intentions was laid to rest by
decades of congressional acquiescence, capped by Congress' express pres-
ervation in ITSFEA of previously recognized private rights of suit.'2 The
imagined danger of "ID]raconian, exorbitant damages" 12 was contained by
conservative damage rules that were developed in the circuits that applied
enterprise liability.1'2
The supposition that NPI traders necessarily exceed the scope of their
employment was undermined by a series of cases in which broker-dealers'
registered representatives (reps'26) passed tips from the employer's under-
121. O'Connor & Assoc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179, 1194
(S.D.N.Y. 1981). In this case, the plaintiff alleged that officers and employees of the defendant
corporation traded on nonpublic information about the company, but did not allege with
specificity that they traded within the scope of their employment.
122. Id. A similar perception may have underlain an observation of the SEC staff in
regard to enterprise liability, which declared:
During the Committee's hearings, several witnesses expressed concern that an em-
ployer or controlling person could be exposed to litigation and potential liability
under a respondeat superior theory, where an errant employee or agent engaged in
insider trading for his own account and the principal did not benefit from or induce-
the violation. While the Committee does not believe that a principal would be found
liable in such circumstances, under existing law, it believes that the possibility of
such liability should be clearly eliminated. Even if the principal would ultimately
not be liable, it should not be required to defend meritless lawsuits in such
circumstances. (Emphasis supplied).
Insider Trading: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 79-80 (1988) [hereinafter
Insider Trading].
123. See Exchange Act § 20A(d), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78t-l(d) (West Supp. 1992); infra text
accompanying notes 203-06.
124. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 170 (2d Cir. 1980).
125. See Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1982); Ohio Drill & Tool Co. v.
Johnson, 498 F.2d 186 (6th Cir. 1974); Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973).
126. The employees who take investors' orders to buy or sell securities, popularly known
as "brokers," are designated in the language of the Securities Acts as "registered representa-
tives" of "broker-dealers," sometimes abbreviated in trade lingo as "reps."
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writing or acquisitions departments to a favored client. 27 These cases showed
that broker-dealers, if not restrained by law, could make a very profitable
business of gathering nonpublic information from some of their clients and
passing it on as tips to others clients, or using it in their own market
operations. Press reports of practices in Drexel Burnham Lambert indicated
that a major investment bank engaged persistently in NPI trading and
tipping in aid of its underwriting business.2 1
The impropriety of penalizing employers for their employees' "frolics"
was contained by excluding liability for acts that are outside the scope of
employment or authority under traditional agency principles. 29 This principle
would have resolved the Ninth Circuit case that initiated the rejection of
enterprise liability and another that reinforced it without erecting a conflict
between the common law and the Securities Acts. 30
Eventually, the two circuits that had rejected enterprise liability re-
canted."' Their reversals were probably influenced by amicus curiae briefs
filed by the SEC, which argued that enterprise liability corresponded to the
will of Congress.
In 1981, the Third Circuit held that enterprise liability was applicable
to an accounting firm whose employee issued a misleading opinion. The
court observed that its earlier decision in Rochez Brothers v. Rhoades32
had recognized exceptions under which it could impose liability without
overruling the prior case.' In 1990, the Ninth Circuit flatly renounced its
former view, and affirmed the applicability of enterprise liability to suits
127. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.
1979); Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1980); Fridrich v. Bradford,
542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976).
128. See JAMEs B. STEWART, DEN OF Tmavas 175-206 (1991); James B. Stewart, Scenes
from a Scandal, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 1991, at BI, B6. Top executives' approval of illegal
securities activites of a different type were disclosed in other firms. See William Power, Da
Puzzo Debacle is Least Likely Yet in Raft of Scandals, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 1991, at C1;
Kevin G. Salwen & Paulette Thomas, Breeden Says "Distressingly Large" Number of Wall
Street Firms Submitted False Orders, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 1991, at Cl; Michael Siconolfi
et al., Top Salomon Officials Knew About Illegal Bid, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 1991, at Cl.
129. See Sweasey v. A. G. Edwards & Son, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 1278 (W.D. Mo. 1990);
Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1425 (N.D. I1. 1989); Moss v. Morgan
Stanley Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1356-57 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984); Holloway v. Howerdd, 377 F. Supp. 754 (M.D. Tenn. 1973),
aff'd, 536 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976).
130. In Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1967), the court
found the employer not liable on a common law fraud count because the agent lacked apparent
authority. In Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025
(1975), the employee was a newspaper columnist, whose trading or tipping was no part of the
agent's actual or apparent duties to the employer.
131. Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981); Hollinger v. Titan Capital
Corp., 914 F.2d 1564 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1621 (1991).
132. 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975).
133. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d at 181. In footnote 5, the court explained that as a
mere panel of the circuit bench it was not at liberty to overrule Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades,
527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975).
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under the Securities Acts.'3 Ironically, these decisions brought federal courts
into convergence on enterprise liability during the same decade in which
Congress excluded it from suits under ITSFEA.
4. Effects on results of suits
Regardless of whether a court applied enterprise liability or rebuttable
liability, the consequence was often the same. In courts that applied enter-
prise liability, some employers escaped on the ground that the employee
was acting outside the scope of employment or authority. In one recurrent
type of case, a corporation's employee learned of an impending tender offer
and tipped a confederate who bought before the tender offer was announced.
In this type of case, the employee acted outside of his employment and
authority, both actual and apparent.' With this type of case in mind, one
federal judge observed, rather extravagantly, that "a corporate insider
necessarily exceeds the scope of his employment when he trades on the basis
of material, nonpublic information."' 3 6 Similarly, reps who passed tips to
noncustomers were held to have acted outside the scope of their employ-
ment. 1
7
Other brokers whose reps deceived the brokers' own clients escaped
liability on showing that the rep was not acting on the broker's behalf, and
the customer knew it, or should have known it. 38 In one case, some of the
plaintiff customers who dealt with a fraudulent agent knew that the agent
was a registered representative of the defendant broker, but others did not;
those who knew recovered judgment, but those who did not know were
defeated because no appearance of authority was apparent to them. 139
There were other NPI trading cases in which an employee passed
nonpublic information to a customer of the employer, thereby acting, or
appearing to act, within the scope of authority. In this type of case, a court
that adhered to enterprise liability imposed it on the employer without a
second thought.14' Some of the leading opinions that rejected enterprise
liability could have reached the same result on the ground that the employ-
ee's conduct was outside the agent's actual or apparent authority. 4' One of
134. Hollinger, 914 F.2d at 1577-78.
135. See O'Connor & Assoc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
136. Id. at 1194.
137. Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1356-57 (S.D.N.Y), aff'd, 719
F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision without passing on the secondary liability argument because it found
that the rep had violated no duty to the plaintiff.
138. See Sweasey v. A. G. Edwards & Son, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 1278 (W.D. Mo. 1990);
Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1425 (N.D. Il1. 1989).
139. Holloway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976).
140. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.
1974).
141. See Christoffel v. E. F. Hutton & Co., 588 F.2d 665, 668 (9th Cir. 1978) (involving
broker's rep as simultaneously guardian of estate and committing frauds in his capacity as
guardian).
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these was the opinion that originated the rejection of enterprise liability. 4 2
Although rebuttable liability is more lenient than enterprise liability,
many of the employers who would incur liability under the latter may incur
it also under the former. Brokers were held liable in a pair of cases in
circuits that adhered to rebuttability; the opinions do not disclose what, if
any, evidence of good faith and nonparticipation the brokers presented.
43
Decisions holding that the proof of innocence was sufficient are more
numerous.'" Almost any attention to the behavior of agents seemed to




During the years when the circuits differed on enterprise liability,
brokers' risks of liability for the fraudulent acts of their reps was substan-
tially greater if they were sued in the First, Second, Sixth, Seventh, and
Eighth Circuits, which adhered to enterprise liability, than if they were sued
in the Third or Ninth Circuits, which adhered to rebuttability, or in the
Fourth, where decisions were inconsistent. But most large brokerage firms
could be sued in the Second Circuit because they had offices in New York;
sophisticated plaintiffs' counsel could be expected to sue in that circuit. As
a result, most broker-client relations were probably subject in practice to
enterprise liability even before the Third and Ninth Circuits joined the
majority.
III. ENTERPRISE LIABILITY AFTER ITSFEA
While enterprise liability was establishing its supremacy under the Se-
curities Acts of 1933 and 1934, it was routed from the new territory staked
out by ITSFEA. This Act, adopted in 1988, authorized an explicit private
right of suit 46 and an expansion of administrative remedies 47 for illegal use
of unpublished information. The predicate conduct involved not only using
unpublished information for buying and selling, but also communicating it
142. See supra note 90.
143. Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976); Hecht v. Harris, Upham &
Co., 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970). The suits in both cases were based on churning the
customer's account. In the Hecht case, the primary question was whether churning was
actionable under the Securities Acts. In the Straub case, the court observed that the defendant
broker defended chiefly on the ground of lack of reliance by the customer. Straub, 540 F.2d
at 598. See also Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 1011 (1980) (holding broker-dealer liable both under presumptive liability
and enterprise liability tests).
144. See Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
II S. Ct. 1621 (1991); Carpenter v. Harris, Upham & Co., 594 F.2d 388 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979); Christoffel, 588 F.2d at 665; Haynes v. Anderson & Strudwick,
Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1303 (E.D. Va. 1981); Barthe v. Rizzo, 384 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
145. Barthe, 384 F. Supp. at 1063.
146. Exchange Act § 20A(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78t-l(a) (West Supp. 1992).
147. Exchange Act § 21A, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-1, added by ITSFEA, 102 Stat. 4677.
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to others who might so use it, known as "tipping."' 14 For brevity, I embrace
both activities within "NPI trading."'
149
With respect to both private and administrative remedies, Congress
excluded liability imposed "solely by reason of employing another per-
son."'10 For private suits, ITSFEA preserved the prima facie but rebuttable
liability of controllers,'' but for suits by the SEC excluded even the prima
facie liability. 5 2 ITSFEA disclaimed any intention to change the law with
respect to remedies other than those newly authorized.5 3
The declared purposes of ITSFEA were to provide "additional methods
... to deter and prosecute" insider trading' 54 and to "augment enforce-
ment."' 155 The evil was seen as widespread among brokerage firms, which
needed to take more rigorous measures to root out violations. The House
Report declared,
The wave of insider trading cases in recent years has demonstrated
the potential for abuse in even the largest and most prestigious of
Wall Street securities firms. In the view of the Committee, the
scandal represents far more than the transgressions of a few indi-
148. Exchange Act §§ 20A(c), 21A(a), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78t-l(c), 78u-l(a).
149. Tipping was included within "trading" by implication in the hearings on Insider
Trading, supra note 122.
150. Exchange Act §§ 20A(b)(3), 21A(b)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78t-l(b)(3), 78u-1(b)(2), as
amended by ITSFEA, 102 Stat. 4677.
151. Exchange Act § 20A(b)(3), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78t-l(b)(3). The paragraph declared:
No person shall be liable under this section solely by reason of employing another
person who is liable under this section, but the liability of a controlling person under
this section shall be subject to section 20(a) [15 U.S.C.A. § 78t-l(a)] of this title.
152. Exchange Act § 21A(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-1(b). The relevant provisions were:
(1) Liability of controlling persons-No controlling person shall be subject to a
penalty under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section unless the Commission establishes
that-
(A) such controlling person knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that such
controlled person was likely to engage in the act or acts constituting the violation
and failed to take appropriate steps to prevent such act or acts before they occurred;
or
(B) such controlling person knowingly or recklessly failed to establish, maintain, or
enforce any policy or procedure required under section 15(f) of this title [15 U.S.C.A.
§ 77oo(f)] or section 204A of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 [15 U.S.C.A. §
80f-4a] and such failure substantially contributed to or permitted the occurrence of
the act or acts constituting the violation.
(2) Additional restrictions on liability-No person shall be subject to a penalty under
subsection (a) of this section solely by reason of employing another person who is
subject to a penalty under such subsection, unless such employing person is liable
as a controlling person under paragraph (1) of this subsection. Section 20(a) of this
title [15 U.S.C.A. § 78t(a)] shall not apply to actions under subsection (a) of this
section.
153. Exchange Act §§ 20A(d)-(e), 21A(d)(3), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78t-l(d)-(e), 78u-l(d)(3) (1988).
154. ITSFEA § 2(3), 102 Stat. at 4677.
155. H.R. REp. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043,
6044.
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viduals. There is a clear need for an institutional, rather than merely
individual, response to this problem. In the view of the Committee,
firms whose lifeblood is the continued public trust in our securities
markets must do more to share in the responsibility for policing
those markets and should be subject to considerable penalties for
a shirking of that responsibility.
5 6
Senator John Heinz, explaining ITSFEA on the Senate floor, emphasized
the role of the private suit as a reinforcement of administrative sanctions.
He declared: "The SEC cannot fight this war alone. Consequently, Congress
must give honest market participants a clear right to judicial action to take
back illegal profits from insider traders."1
7
The provisions of ITSFEA with respect to private suits, however, ran
counter to the expressed purposes. The amount of liability was capped,"'
and the firms that "must do more to share in the responsibility" were
relieved of liability if they "acted in good faith" and "did not induce" the
guilty act. 5 9
The discordance between the legislators' professed purposes and what
they did is highlighted by the House Report's declaration that ITSFEA was
"specifically intended to overturn court cases which have precluded recovery
for plaintiffs where the defendant's violation is premised upon the misap-
propriation theory."1 60 The House Report cited Moss v. Morgan Stanley as
an example.' 6' Moss was a case in which an investor sued Morgan Stanley
because a Morgan Stanley employee had tipped a confederate; recovery was
denied because neither the employee nor the employer owed any duty to
the plaintiff. 16 ITSFEA may have enhanced an investor's chances of winning
a judgment against a broker-dealer's impecunious employee, but made it
less likely that a judgment would have to be paid by an employer like
Morgan Stanley. 63 Without enterprise liability, private suitors had little to
gain from the new right of suit, even with an extended time limitation.
64
156. Id. at 14-15 (emphasis added).
157. 134 CoNG. Rzc. S17,219 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement by Sen. Heinz).
158. See Exchange Act § 20A(b)(l)-(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78t-1(b)(l)-(2) (West Supp. 1992).
159. See Exchange Act § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(2) (1988), incorporated by reference in
Exchange Act § 20A(b)(3), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78t-l(b)(3).
160. H.R. REP. No. 910 at 26.
161. 553 F. Supp. 1347 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1025 (1984).
162. Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347 (S.D.N.Y), aff'd, 719 F.2d 5 (2d
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984). The employee, Courtois, had tipped Antoniu,
who tipped Newman, who traded at a profit. Id. at 1352.
163. On the particular facts of Moss, Morgan Stanley would not have been liable even if
the court had recognized a private right of action, because the employee's use of nonpublic
information was outside of the actual and apparent scope of the employment in tipping a
confederate who was not a customer of the employer. See Moss, 553 F. Supp. at 1356-57.
But an employer would be liable in a case like Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1979), where the employee tipped a favored client of the
employer.
164. See Exchange Act § 20A(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(b)(4).
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A. The Express Private Right of Suit
1. Elements of the express right
The new right of suit embraced a very minor fraction of NPI trading
situations. Prior case law had recognized the right of investors to sue NPI
traders who dealt directly or indirectly with the unenlightened investors.
65
Prior cases had also recognized the right of an investor to sue a trader with
whom the investor had no prior dealings if the investor bought or sold on
the open market while the defendant was trading on information emanating
from the issuer.'66
The new cause of action related to the special situation in which an
investor sued an NPI trader with whom the investor had no existing
relationship, and the trader used information emanating from outside the
securities issuer, such as news of an impending takeover bid. In this kind
of case, a decision which the Supreme Court declined to review had held
that the investor had no private right to sue because neither the NPI trader
nor the trader's informant had any duty to the investor. ITSFEA gave the
investor a right to sue if the investor's purchase or sale was contemporaneous
with the NPI trader's and complementary to it. That is, the suitor must
have sold when the NPI trader bought, or bought when the NPI trader
sold. 67
ITSFEA also gave private suitors five years within which to sue,
68
which was more than they were likely to enjoy in other securities fraud
suits. A few months before ITSFEA was enacted, the Third Circuit had
ruled that suits under Rule lOb-5 must be brought within one year from
discovery and three years from the event. 69 This limitation was destined to
be adopted in 1992 by the Supreme Court. 70 Before that court ruled, most
circuits had borrowed state limitations, which provided a bewildering variety
of periods, some of which were longer than the one-and-three-year limits.'7,
While ITSFEA purported to enhance the rights of private suitors, it
imposed new limits on damages and on the conditions of liability. With
respect to damages, ITSFEA limited them to the gain made or the loss
avoided by the NPI trader, from which the defendant could deduct any
165. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
166. See Shapiro, 495 F.2d at 228.
167. Exchange Act § 20A(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(a) (1988).
168. Exchange Act § 20A(b)(3), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78t-l(b)(3) (West Supp. 1992).
169. In re Data Access Sys. Sec., 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 849
(1988). The one-and-three-year periods were adopted by analogy to the express limitations in
Securities Act § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m, and in Exchange Act §§ 9(e), 18(c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e),
77r(c).
170. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, I11 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
171. See Robert B. Martin, Jr., Statutes of Limitation in lOb-5 Actions: Which State
Statute is Applicable? 29 Bus. LAw. 443 (1974). Beside the variety of time limits, there were
differences in the degrees to which the limits were extended by concealment or nondiscovery
of the offense.
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amount payable pursuant to an SEC enforcement proceeding. 72 Even this
amount was likely to be hard to collect from a mere employee.
2. The exclusion of enterprise liability
The clearest statement of the exclusion of enterprise liability appeared
not in ITSFEA itself,173 but in the House Report that accompanied the bill
that became ITSFEA. The House report announced: "IT]he bill rules out
the use of respondeat superior theory in private actions for insider trading
by contemporaneous traders."' 74
The House Report offered no explanation of how the use of respondeat
superior would impede ITSFEA's objectives of deterring insider trading and
facilitating private suits, and no notice of the fact that excluding respondeat
superior would be a radical departure from the case law of most Circuit
Courts of Appeal 75 and from the common law of fraud and other torts. 76
There was no Senate Report on the bill. Three of the four Senators
who spoke on the Senate floor in support of the bill mentioned the grant
of a private right of suit, but none of them revealed that this private right
would be more limited than the rights of suit that had been previously
172. Exchange Act § 20A(b)(1)-(2). See Barbara Bader Aldave, The Insider Trading and
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988: An Analysis and Appraisal, 52 ALB. L. REv. 893,
919 (1988).
173. Section 20A(b)(3) declares that "No person shall be liable under this section solely
by reason of employing another person . . ." Because of the word "solely," the clause is
ambiguous. See infra text accompanying notes 195-201.
174. H.R. REp. No. 910 at 27. This interpretation was echoed by commentators on
ITSFEA. See Aldave, supra note 172, at 914 n.16; Howard M. Friedman, The Insider Trading
and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 68 N.C. L. REv. 465, 486 n.159; Stuart J.
Kaswell, An Insider's View of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of
1988, 45 Bus. LAW. 145, 167 (1989); Gary G. Lynch & James D. Herbert, Enforcement and
Compliance Under the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, in
ADVANCED SEcturriEs LAw WoRKsHOP 535, 546 (PLI) (1990); Bruce A. Teeters, Note, Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988: Just How Much Are Employers Going
to Pay?, 59 U. CIN. L. Rav. 587, 598 (1990).
For a critical comment on reliance on committee reports to establish meanings that do
not appear in statutory texts, see Note, Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult Legislative
History Today, 105 HAxv. L. REv. 1005 (1992).
175. In 1988, the Ninth Circuit had not yet repudiated rebuttable liability. See supra text
accompanying notes 90-99.
176. Equally silent is Kaswell, supra note 174. Kaswell was Minority Counsel of the Senate
Committee involved in the drafting of ITSFEA. Aldave, supra note 172, and Friedman, supra
note 174, mention the exclusion of respondeat superior only in footnotes. This feature of the
Act was not even mentioned in two summaries of the new private right of suit in the Federal
Securities Regulation and Law Report. 20 SEc. REG. & L. RaP. 1393, 1623 (1988). See also
Michael J. Chimel, Note, The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988:
Codifying a Private Right of Action, 1990 U. ILL. L. REv. 645 (1990) (passing over exclusion
of respondeat superior); William K.S. Wang, ITSFEA 's Effect on Either an Implied Cause of
Action For Damages by Contemporaneous Traders or an Action For Damages or Rescission
by the Party in Privity with the Insider Trader, 16 J. CORP. L. 445 (1991) (same).
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recognized.'" Their remarks indicated that the new private right of suit was
simply an extension of existing rights to additional situations. Senator Jake
Garn explained it this way:
This legislation contains an express provision for private actions by
all contemporaneous traders. It thus affirms those cases granting
such actions in traditional insider cases, and rejects the holdings of
others that imposed limitations on the class of plaintiffs or on other
aspects of the remedy.1
7 8
In hearings on bills that led up to ITSFEA, sponsors of the bills
indicated that the liability of employers would continue to be governed by
the same principles as before, which comprised enterprise liability. In an
early hearing, a Congressman raised the question of whether the liability of
employers should be increased, and the Commission made the following
written reply: "No, the Commission has not concluded that any change in
the liability of broker-dealer firms for unlawful trading violations committed
by their employees is necessary at this time.' 79 Ensuing paragraphs indicated
that the answer was directed primarily to liability in enforcement actions
maintained by the the Commission, but concluded with an express reference
to liablility in private suits.
Harvey L. Pitt and John F. Olson, explaining an earlier version of the
"by reason of employment" clause, declared:
Proposed subsection (d) of the Insider Trading Proscriptions Act
would create a closely circumscribed "safe harbor" for persons who
employ or control individuals who violate the prohibitions of the
Act, by dictating that employers and controlling persons shall not
be derivately liable for such violations of employees or controlled
persons based solely upon their employment or control of the
individual who has committed the violation.
... Essentially, the new provision would protect employers from
liability in the cases when the employee is off on a frolic of his
own which is neither condoned by, nor of economic benefit to, the
employer.8 0
The phrase "frolic of his own" obviously refers to the conception of
scope of employment, which is a component of enterprise liability.' 8, It
177. See 134 CONo. REc. S17,218 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Sen. Proxmire);
134 CoNo. REc. S17,219 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Sen. Heinz); 134 CoNG. REc.
S17,219-20 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Sen. Gan).
178. Id. at S17,220.
179. Securities Regulation Issues: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications
and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 187, 190
(1987) [hereinafter Securities Regulation].
180. Definition of Insider Trading: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1987)
[hereinafter Definition of Insider Trading] (emphasis added).
181. See Smith, supra note 25.
1992]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:913
would be irrelevant to a liability that is rebuttable by good faith and
noninducement.
Charles Cox, Acting Chairman of the SEC, was asked, "What would
be the liability of a brokerage firm ... for the insider trading of one of
its employees ... ?" He replied:
It is essentially the same as current law. If we are talking about a
multiservice firm where the person doing the trading did not know
the information and the firm had reasonable and appropriate pro-
cedures to prevent a violation of law, there would be a defense.
The same defense exists under current law. However, if you're
talking about the situation where someone is off trading on his
own, then that is the same as the current law, also, liability depends
on the existing securities laws, controlling person provisions and
common law doctrines of respondeat superior.In
The only passage in the legislative history that pointed to an exclusion
of enterprise liability accompanied a bill submitted by the Commission
which barred liability "solely by reason of employment" when the employer
received no profit from the transaction. This passage appeared in a document
entitled Proposed Language for Inclusion in Committee Report on Insider
Trading. It declared:
During the Committee's hearings, several witnesses expressed con-
cern that an employer or controlling person could be exposed to
litigation and potential liability under a respondeat superior theory,
where an errant employee or agent engaged in insider trading for
his own account and the principal did not benefit from or induce
the violation [citing testimony in hearings]. While the Committee
does not believe that a principal would be found liable in such
circumstances under existing law [citing a federal court decision], it
believes that the possibility of such liability should be clearly elim-
inated. Even if the principal would ultimately not be liable, it should
not be required to defend meritless lawsuits in such circumstances. 8"
The Commission's willingness to accept an interpretation that made the
presumptive liability principle exclusive may be explained partly by the fact
that the grounds for rebutting presumptive liability under the SEC's bill
were narrower than under the eventual section 20(a). The SEC's proposed
clause was the following:
Except as provided in Section 20(a) of this title, no person shall be
liable under this section solely by reason of the fact that such person
182. Definition of Insider Trading, supra note 180, at 15 (emphasis added). The provision
in the bill on which Cox testified differed only slightly from the provision in the eventual
ITSFEA. See § 16A(d) as proposed in S. 1680, Definition of Insider Trading, supra, at 50.
183. "Proposed Language for Inclusion in Committee Report on Insider Trading Defi-
nition," in Insider Trading, supra note 122, at 79-80.
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controls or employs a person who has violated this section, if such
controlling person or employer did not participate in, profit from,
or directly or indirectly induce the acts constituting the violation of
this section.'
The effects of this provision would not have been very different from
those of enterprise liability, since "participate" and "profit" would include
most of the same cases covered by "scope of employment." In a case where
a broker-dealer's rep tipped a favored client who then traded with the
broker-dealer, the broker-dealer would be liable on grounds of both partic-
ipation and profit.
But the final ITSFEA did not incorporate "participate" or "profit,"
and the House Committee did not incorporate in its report the Commission's
suggested explanation of the "by reason of employing" clause. ITSFEA
was left with neither a reason nor an explanation for excluding enterprise
liability.
The idea of excluding enterprise liability from ITSFEA probably orig-
inated in the provisions on enforcement actions, in which the SEC could
demand penalties up to three times the profit made or loss avoided by the
NPI trader. These provisions were the subject of the amendment of Ex-
change Act section 21A, which legislators and commentators alike regarded
as the principal focus of ITSFEA.
18
Section 21A included the same language as 20A on liability "solely by
reason of employing," but did not rely on this phrase to eliminate enterprise
liability. It provided expressly that no one should be liable by virtue of
controlling another unless the Commission could prove that the controller
knowingly or recklessly neglected to take appropriate measures to prevent
NPI trading by controlees.186 The measures included "any policy or proce-
dure required under section 15(f)" of the Exchange Act, which authorized
the Commission to specify policies and procedures. 87
In excluding the use of enterprise liability in enforcement actions pros-
ecuted by the SEC, the ITSFEA conformed to the prevailing tendency of
federal court decisions. 88 At the same time, it gave new definition to the
duty of care owed by employers and other controllers.
The main support in the legislative history for excluding enterprise
liability was the testimony of various witnesses for the Securities Industry
184. Section 16A(e) of SEC bill, Insider Trading, supra note 122, at 57 (emphasis added);
Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1987)
[hereinafter Proscriptions Act].
185. See Kaswell, supra note 174; Friedman, supra note 184; Lynch & Herbert, supra
note 174; Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 30, at 1590-93.
186. Exchange Act § 21A(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 788u-l(b) (West Supp. 1992).
187. Exchange Act § 15(f), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(0.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 84-87.
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Association.'89 To impose liability on employers would impede the flow of
information to agents and clients, they said,'19 apparently on the supposition
that firms would hesitate to disseminate information that might be regarded
as nonpublic. One statement stressed the impossibility of "delving into the
mind of an employee," insider trading being "a crime of the mind."' 9
These remarks were apparently directed primarily at SEC suits, in which
treble damages could be assessed.
While opposing enterprise liability, one industry representative professed
"zeal for eliminating insider trading as well as for providing severe penalties
for those who engage in such trading."'9 A brokerage officer averred that
"the broker-dealer firms all need to be more rigorous in monitoring the
Chinese Walls to assure they are not being breached."' 93 But the increased
sanctions were to be applied to the employees, not to the employers.
The rejection of enterprise liability was supported also by Rudoph W.
Giuliani, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, who declared
without further explanation: "There should be a defense available for the
firm that it has in essence done everything it reasonably could do to avoid
the problem, yet it has been victimized by an employee.' 94 This was clearly
a reference to the provisions of section 21A(b)(1) on enforcement proceed-
ings, which called for broker-dealers to establish, maintain, and enforce
procedures required by SEC rules. It furnished no support for exoneration
on the basis of mere good faith and noninducement.
The exclusion of enterprise liability appears to have spilled out of the
provisions for SEC enforcement proceedings into provisions for private
damage suits without any consideration of differences between these kinds
of actions and without any definition of supervisory obligations like those
that accompanied the exclusion from enforcement proceedings.
3. Is enterprise liability really excluded?
Notwithstanding the House Report's announcement that ITSFEA ex-
cludes respondeat superior, the language of ITSFEA does not reveal the
exclusion to a careful reader. If any basis for the supposed exclusion can
be found in the words of the statute, it is in the sentence that declares:
"No person shall be liable under this section solely by reason of employing
189. See Insider Trading, supra note 122, at 108-14 (statement of the Securities Industry
Association); Proscriptions Act, supra note 184, at 45 (testimony of Edward O'Brien, President
of the Securities Industry Association).
190. Insider Trading, supra note 122, at 113-14, 146.
191. Id. at 112.
192. Id. at 105 (testimony of John W. Bachmann, Chairman of Securities Industry
Association).
193. Oversight of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Securities Industry:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, 17 (1987) [hereinafter Oversight] (statement of
Donald B. Marron, Chairman of Paine Webber Group, Inc.).
194. Insider Trading, supra note 122, at 88 (emphasis added).
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another person who is liable under this section, but the liability of a
controlling person under this section shall be subject to section 20(a) of this
title." 195
An analytic examination shows that this exclusion effected no departure
from the prior law of enterprise liability. Enterprise liability was never
imposed "solely by reason of employing," but by reason of employing plus
the employee's acting within the scope of employment or authority. This
was not only the common law, 96 but also the rule applied in the federal
circuits that used enterprise liability in NPI trading cases. 97 Scope of
employment is not a matter of defense, 98 but something the third party
must prove.' 99 In order to find in these words an exclusion of enterprise
liability, one must transpose "solely" from the first to the second clause,
making the sentence read: "No person shall be liable under this section
[...] by reason of employing another person who is liable under this
section, but the liability of a controlling person under this section shall be
subject [solely] to section 20(a) of this title."
A reading that is more literal, more consistent with legislative history,
and more compatible with prior securities law would view the two clauses
of the sentence as dealing with two different subjects. The first clause
addresses the liability of employers; the second clause addresses the liability
of controllers in general, including the officers, directors, major shareholders
and financiers of corporations, who are not affected by the provision on
"employing another."
This reading responds to two separate questions that had emerged from
NPI trading cases in the 1980s. One question was whether an investment
banker like Morgan Stanley was liable for the acts of an employee who
leaked information to a confederate trader for purposes of his own.2° By
the first clause of the sentence, Congress assured that employers would
continue to escape liability for the acts of employees on "frolics of their
own." The clause assured this result by providing that the investment banker
should not be liable "solely by reason of employing . .."
A second question involved the extent to which major shareholders,
officers, directors, and other controllers of corporations should be held
195. Exchange Act § 20A(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(b)(3) (1988) (emphasis added).
196. RETATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 228, 265 (1958).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 135-39.
198. See W. EDWARD SELL, AGENCY 88-91, 105 (1975) (discussing scope of employment
as element of liability and not under matters of defense). In the Restatement, scope of
employment or authority are integral parts of the liability principle. See RESTATEzmNT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY §§ 219, 257 (1958).
199. See Energy Factors, Inc. v. Nuevo Energy Co., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,446,
91,946 (dismissing suit against employer for lack of specific allegation that offending employee
was not "on a frolic"). For routine assertions of the principle that a plaintiff must prove that
employee's tort was within scope of employment in order to sustain a claim against the
employer, see Gumm v. National Homes Acceptance Corp., 339 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1965); 57
C.J.S. Master & Servant § 615 (1948 & Supp. 1991).
200. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 719 F.2d 5
(2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
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liable for the NPI trading of corporation employees. 20' The second clause
of the quoted sentence assured that these "controlling persons" would
continue to be governed by the rebuttable liability of section 20(a) and
would not be confused with "employers," who are liable regardless of their
own good faith and lack of inducement.
Analyzed in this way the ITSFEA carried forward to the new private
right of suit the same principles of derivative liability that a majority of
federal courts had applied to NPI trading in preceding years. The House
Report's assertion that respondeat superior had been excluded would be
regarded either as a careless carryover of a statement that had accompanied
the abandoned SEC bill, or a bald attempt at legislation by Committee
Report. The House Report's assertion is likely, however, to prevail in the
courts, which often find the explanations in committee reports more illu-
minating than the Delphic utterances of statutes.
B. Surviving Implied Rights of Suit
Most varieties of suits against NPI traders may escape the enterprise
liability exclusion because they can be prosecuted without invoking ITSFEA.
Suitors who can frame a complaint without invoking ITSFEA will normally
prefer to do so since they may thereby escape the arguable exclusion of
enterprise liability and the subordination of their damages to prior claims
of the SEC. 2 2 For them, the question will be whether the exclusion of
enterprise liability affects suits that fall within the terms of ITSFEA, but
are equally authorized by earlier case law.
This question will be relevant to virtually all kinds of "insider trading"
cases, since they all involve the use of nonpublic information contempora-
neously with some transaction of the complainant.
1. Negative implications?
Congress rejected as emphatically as it could any implication that the
grant of an express right of suit for NPI trading implied the exclusion of
preexisting implied rights. ITSFEA declared: "Nothing in this section shall
be construed to limit or condition the right of any person to bring an action
to enforce a requirement of this title or the availability of any cause of
action implied from a provision of this title.''203
This clause was no routine disclaimer, but a deliberate rejection of an
express exclusivity clause that had appeared in one of the bills that led up
201. See Durham v. Kelly, 810 F.2d 1500 (9th Cir. 1987).
202. See Wang, supra note 176; T. Rowe Price New Horizons Fund, Inc. v. Preletz, 749
F. Supp. 705 (D. Md. 1990). In Horizons, an investor sought in vain to recover on the basis
of contemporaneous trading without the limitations imposed on private suits by Exchange Act
§ 20A, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78t-1 (West Supp. 1992).
203. Exchange Act § 20A(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(d). "This title" refers to the Exchange
Act. To the same effect, see H.R. REP. No. 910 at 27.
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to ITSFEA. 204 On its face, that clause appeared to exclude only other
definitions of insider trading, but some language of the SEC chairman
suggested that it was also intended to exclude rights of action for insider
trading other than those expressed in ITSFEA.205 Chairman Ruder's letter
accompanying the proposal contained this paragraph: -
The scope of the bill's exclusivity-The compromise bill contains a
legislative finding on exclusivity. The legislative history should clar-
ify two important points. First, the statute is only exclusive with
respect to the federal securities laws; actions brought under state
law, or the federal mail and wire fraud or other statutes, are
unaffected. 2o6
In rejecting Chairman Ruder's proposal, Congress emphasized its de-
cision to preserve the rights of suit that had been recognized before ITSFEA
was adopted.
2. Compatibility with the whole Securities Acts
Although legislators did not intend by enacting ITSFEA to restrict
preexisting rights of suit, they could not help changing the statutory matrix
within which the presumptive liability clauses must be applied to rights that
predated ITSFEA. For judges who rejected enterprise liability before 1988,
the apparent decision of Congress to exclude it from ITSFEA will presum-
ably confirm their preexisting view that rejection fits the comprehensive
rationality of the Securities Acts.
For judges who were previously favorable to enterprise liability, the
solution is less obvious. If they accept the view that ITSFEA excludes
enterprise liability from suits brought under it, they may infer that the same
policy would further the objectives of other provisions of the Securities
Acts. On the other hand, these judges may find in ITSFEA additional
reasons for retaining enterprise liability in other contexts. ITSFEA itself
contained a finding that "additional methods are appropriate to deter and
prosecute violations" of insider trading rules. 2 7 The House Report empha-
204. Proposed § 16A(a)(5) of Exchange Act, in SEC's Proposed Insider Trading Bill,
Nov. 18, 1987; Proscriptions Act, supra note 184, at 28-29; Insider Trading, supra note 122,
at 55. The text of the paragraph was:
It is appropriate to, and this section does, establish exclusive statutory prohibitions
that clarify the conduct that constitutes the wrongful trading of securities while in
possession of material, nonpublic information, and the wrongful communication of
such information, under the federal securities laws, thereby reducing uncertainties in
the state of the law without otherwise affecting existing statutory prohibitions against
manipulative, deceptive or fraudulent conduct. (Emphasis supplied).
Id.
205. Proscriptions Act, supra note 184, at 26-27 (letter of David S. Ruder, Chairman of
SEC to Senators Donald Riegle and Alfonse D'Amato); Insider Trading, supra note 122, at
52-53.
206. Insider Trading, supra note 122, at 52-53; Proscriptions Act, supra note 184, at 27.
207. ITSFEA § 2(3), 102 Stat. at 4677.
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sized the need for brokerage firms to "do more to share in the responsibility
for policing these markets." 208 Besides, Congress emphasized in the clearest
terms its intention to preserve all the private remedies for insider trading
that existed before ITSFEA was adopted.
209
In view of these factors, judges may concede that even if ITSFEA
excludes enterprise liabilility from suits brought under it, the exclusion is
one of those anomalies that are insinuated into legislative drafts and
committee reports without reflecting any consensus on policy. This appraisal
would be supported by the absence of any disclosure in the House Report
of a major shift of legal principle and the lack of any explanation for such
a shift. So viewed, the exclusion does not call for any effort to interpret
other provisions of the Securities Acts to make them compatible with the
anomaly.
At the least, ITSFEA will provide lawyers with grounds for renewing
the debate about enterprise liability under other sections of the Securities
Acts.
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF REBUTTABLE LIABIIrY
The choice of rebuttable liability instead of enterprise liability is likely
to have consequences that are economically and socially significant, even if
difficult to observe and measure. I will consider first the consequences of
the particular form of rebuttable liability that was chosen by Congress or,
more realistically, chosen by the staffers who wrote the House Report. I
will then speculate briefly on the consequences of a form of rebuttable
liability that might better serve the purposes of Congress.
Although the literature of tort law is rich with favorable evaluations of
enterprise liability, 210 the evaluators do not answer directly some of the
questions suggested by ITSFEA'S remarkable proscription. Most of the
evaluators have addressed a choice between enterprise liability and personal
liablility. Between these two poles, there is no room for argument in the
modern world.
ITSFEA presents a subtler choice between enterprise liability and a
prima facie liability that is rebuttable by proving the absence of specified
elements of fault. Under ITSFEA, these elements are good faith and
noninducement. Other varieties of rebuttable liability also merit considera-
tion. Liability might be rebutted by proof of freedom from reckless disregard
of precautions, as suggested by the enforcement action section of ITSFEA,
or by proof of diligence in supervision of employees, as suggested by the
laws of Germany and Puerto Rico.
ITSFEA also invites the question whether NPI trading in particular,
and securities frauds in general, are less suitable subjects than other torts
for the invocation of enterprise liability.
208. H.R. REP. No. 910 at 14-15.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 203-04.
210. See supra notes 25-30.
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A. Deterrence
ITSFEA's exclusion of enterprise liability surrenders the most powerful
weapon for the deterrence of NPI trading, which is the motivation of
employers to prevent their employees from committing it. Employers are
far more able than are their customers, unrelated investors, or the SEC to
discover what their employees are doing. The deterrent power of laws
against NPI trading depends primarily on how these laws motivate employers
to police the activities of their employees.
Under ITSFEA's rule of rebuttable liability, as under enterprise liability,
an employer may be expected to announce a passel of rules about trading
and tipping and to lecture employees about them. The rules will include
"Chinese walls" dividing underwriting and merger-acquisition departments
from trading departments. A securities industry executive at a congressional
hearing described in detail practices of these kinds that were already em-
ployed by major financial service firms.
2 "1
However, a profit-maximizing employer would be primarily concerned
not with eliminating NPI trading, but with eliminating liability for such
trading. Some NPI trading and tipping, done on behalf of the employer or
the employer's clients, would, in the absence of liability, enhance the
employer's profits. Consequently, the employer's behavior, so far as it
responds to the threat of liability, would be directed against being sued or
prosecuted rather than against NPI trading itself.
Under enterprise liability, a profit-maximizing employer would want to
prevent employees from engaging in any detectable NPI trading. Under the
rebuttable liability rule, the employer would want, rather, to save itself
from being detected in any tolerance or inducement of NPI trading, but
would have no interest in preventing NPI trading that would benefit the
employer or its customers if the employer could not be shown to have
tolerated or induced it. As the Maryland District Court observed in Johns
Hopkins University v. Hutton212 , rebuttable liability would "give blessing
to a hear-no-evil, see-no-evil approach by partners of a brokerage house.
' 213
Under either rule, an employer would have to decide what level of
expenditure is worthwhile in view of the risk of liability. Because the risk
of liability would be greater under enterprise liability than under rebuttable
liability, employers would naturally devote less effort under the latter rule
than under the former.
214
These considerations in favor of enterprise liability are similar to those
that have been invoked to support enterprise liability for all kinds of torts,
211. See, e.g., Securities Regulations, supra note 179, at 123-36 (statement of Stephen L.
Hammerman, Executive Vice President of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith).
212. 297 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th
Cir. 1970).
213. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 297 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970).
214. Cf. CooTER & ULEN, supra note 30, at 367-69 (comparing negligence liability with
strict liability with respect to level of expenditure on prevention).
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with special emphasis on personal injuries. 2 5 They apply with even greater
force to NPI trading in particular and to securities frauds in general because
employers and employees alike in the securities industry have economic
incentives to commit the offenses. A vigorous desire of employers to
eliminate violations is essential to deterrence.
Some might argue that enterprise liability in private suits is not important
because the new treble damage remedy granted to the SEC2 6 supplies
deterrent enough. This contention assumes that the Commission is immune
to bureaucratic apathy, is safe from capture by special interests, and never
lacks the resources or the zeal that are needed to uncover and prosecute
offenses. If the SEC is less divinely endowed, securities regulation needs
the reinforcement of effective private rights of suit. Congress created the
private right of suit precisely because, in the words of Senator Heinz, "The
SEC cannot fight this war alone. ' ' 217 But this "clear right" would not be
worth much without the support of enterprise liability.
B. Loss distribution
A second objective of enterprise liability that has been viewed as
desirable by most of the tort theorists of the twentieth century is the shifting
of losses away from tort victims. 28 This was one of the merits of ITSFEA's
private right of suit, as viewed by Senator Garn, who observed in support
of the bill that "private investors should have a right to recover when they
have been victimized by insider trading. ' 21 9 Enterprise liability relieves the
distress of tort victims and spreads their losses among consumers through
small and painless increases in the prices they pay for the product or service
that occasions the losses.m
In securities law, enterprise liability achieves loss distribution in some
of the same ways as in other tort law. Like other tortfeasors, purveyors of
false or nonpublic information are likely to be mere employees, who cannot
be forced to pay the costs of their offenses. If losses are to be distributed,
the employers must be the instruments of distribution. Moreover, employers
215. See LADES & POSNER, supra note 30, at 121; SHAvELL, supra note 30, at 170-71.
216. Exchange Act § 21A, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-1 (West Supp. 1992).
217. 134 CoNo. Rac. S17,219 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988). See also supra text accompanying
note 157.
218. See CAi.AaRasi, COSTS, supra note 10; LANDES & POSNER, supra note 30; SHA'VI,
supra note 30; Smith, supra note 25.
219. 134 CoNG. REc. S17,220 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988). In his introductory summary of
the merits of ITSFEA, Senator Gan declared,
This legislation would address these issues in several ways. It would expand the civil
and criminal penalties for insider trading. It would increase the responsibilities of
securities firms to monitor and supervise the actions of their employees. And it
would enable investors who have been adversely affected by insider trading to seek
redress against those who engage in the practice.
Id.
220. CALArREsi, COST, supra note 10, at 68-77; LANDES & POSNER, supra note 30; SHAvELL,
supra note 30.
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in the securities industry are likely to have the necessary resources to
compensate losses and a continuity of activities that enables them to spread
the costs across a large number of transactions.
There are, however, important peculiarities of the securities industry
that make loss distribution operate differently than in other settings. One
peculiarity is the unavailability of insurance to assist in the spreading of
losses. " 1 Investors cannot insure themselves against being defrauded. Issuers,
broker-dealers, and their employees cannot insure themselves against liability
for fraud.
The unavailability of insurance for investors accentuates the importance
of enterprise liability in relieving the losses of fraud victims. If potential
victims could insure themselves, there might be advantages in leaving victims
to insure themselves against loss, rather than imposing enterprise liability
on the employers of tortfeasors. 22 Concluding that automobilists could
insure themselves against their own injuries more cheaply than they could
insure themselves against liability for the injuries of others, Keeton and
O'Connell substituted compulsory first-party insurance for liability insurance
in their no-fault insurance plan." But enterprise liability for securities
frauds cannot be rejected on this ground, since insurance is unavailable for
securities fraud losses.
On the other hand, the unavailability of insurance might be cited as a
disadvantage of enterprise liability for securities frauds on the ground that
employers cannot spread losses through the medium of liability insurance,
as the employers of taxi-drivers are expected to do. But most employers in
the securities industry are likely to be able to self-insure against the liabilities
to which they may be exposed. Since damages for securities frauds are
limited by the magnitude of the transactions out of which the frauds arise,
employers are likely to have assets commensurate with the magnitude of
their liabilities. They are not liable for pain and suffering, and they run
little danger of incurring a disparity like that between a million-dollar
negligence verdict and a five-dollar taxi fare.
A second peculiarity of the securities industry is the capacity of a large
proportion of potential fraud victims to bear their losses without distress
and to spread their losses over a very large number of transactions just as
easily as the employers of offenders can. Institutions such as pension funds
and insurance companies can typically distribute their losses just as widely
as broker-dealers can, and can do so more efficiently because they have no
need to investigate a stranger's claim of loss.
221. This assertion is based partly on responses from lawyers in securities practice who
say they have no knowledge of such insurance and on the obvious moral risk that would
attend the writing of such insurance.
222. See Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 645 (1985).
223. ROBERT E. KEETON & JEFFREY O'CoNNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC
Vicimi; A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AuToMomEE INSURANCE 343-51 (1965).
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Individual investors normally lack the loss-distribution capacities of
institutions, but some of them also present a weak appeal for loss distri-
bution. In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,24 the dissenting judges regarded the
complainants as mere speculators whose "losses" were part of the expected
risks of their investments? 52
Alongside these diversified investors, there are others whose losses are
once-in-a-lifetime events that they cannot possibly spread over a series of
transactions. The Kardons, who received far less than the value of their
shares in a two-family concern, may have lost a substantial fraction of their
family fortune.? 6 The retiring employee who accepted the current market
value of his shares in his corporate employer in ignorance of an impending
merger may have lost a significant proportion of his life savings.?27
Compensation in cases of this kind is appealing not only because the
loss may be large in relation to the victim's total resources, but also because
it appeals to popular conceptions of justice. The gainer is an easily identified
person, whose enrichment is resented not only by the loser but by disinter-
ested observers. Moreover, the gainer's conduct seems more merciless be-
cause the gainer knows the identity of the loser who is hurt. The failure of
the law to compensate in such cases would disturb all but the most calloused
market economists. But cases of this kind are rare, and they are hardly
imaginable in the context of open market transactions among strangers.
The fact that investors' losses from NPI trading are seldom tragic does
not differentiate their claims from those that arise today from other torts.
Various forms of health insurance, disability compensation, and public
assistance also await personal injury victims. In both situations, the law
seeks to protect citizens from losses caused by the faults of others. But in
both, loss distribution today must be viewed as subsidiary to deterrence.
The private right of suit for insider trading arose by implication from a
penal command23 rather than any program designed to compensate inves-
tors. The right conferred by ITSFEA was obviously designed more for
deterrence than for compensation, since the possibility of compensation was
undermined by giving priority to penalties demanded in enforcement ac-
tions.2 9
C. Resource allocation
Loss distribution not only relieves the losses of tort victims at a minor
cost to consumers, but also reduces the level of activities in which injuries
224. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
225. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 255-56, 262 (1988) (White, J., joining
O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
226. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
227. See Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976).
228. Exchange Act § 10(b). See supra note 110.
229. See supra text accompanying note 172.
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are likely to occur by raising their costs and thereby diverting consumer
demand for them. 0 This effect is variously characterized as "resource
allocation" or "general deterrence."' In a graphic illustration of this
conception, Guido Calabresi imagined automobilists switching to safer rail
travel as automobile insurance is made more expensive by imposing liability
on owners .
2
Under a regime of enterprise liability, brokerage firms would presumably
raise their prices to cover the increased costs of policing their employees
and of paying their liabilities when employees are detected in violations.
This might lead investors to reduce the frequency with which they trade in
the expectation of very small gains and divert their efforts to longer term
gains. This diversion seems unlikely to be large enough to affect the
economic utility of securities markets.
However, different kinds of brokerages would be affected differently.
Brokerages that offer cut-rate services without investment advice and do
not engage in underwriting or in mergers and acquisitions would rarely
incur liabilities and would not need to raise their prices. Some investors
would switch to cut-rate brokers from whom they would obtain order
executions at lower cost. Investors who stayed with full-service brokerages
would pay the full costs of such services. This development seems desirable,
forcing investors to pay the true costs of brokers' advice if they want it,
while allowing them to avoid the costs if they do not.
The brokers who continue to supply advice to clients might, however,
reduce their level of activity in producing and disseminating information
because of the difficulty of separating the nonpublic information which
should not be disseminated from the public information that should be.
This possible consequence of enterprise liability was cited by a securities
industry representative who opposed enterprise liability because it would
impede the flow of information to agents and clients of securities firms. I
Impeding the flow of nonpublic information was, of course, the very
purpose of ITSFEA. The enhanced penalties for NPI trading were intended
by Congress to induce the securities industry to expend the effort necessary
to separate public from nonpublic information, whatever the cost might be.
Enterprise liability in private suits could only reinforce the congressional
purpose.
D. Incentives for loss avoidance
Enterprise liability has its vices. One of them, noted in relation to
product liability, is that it reduces the incentives of potential victims to
230. This is a recurrent theme of the law-and-economics school, whose adherents stress
the power of market forces to make prices reflect costs and human behavior to reflect prices.
See STEVEN SHAvELL, ECONOMIC ANALYsIs OF AccrENT LAW 26-32 (1987); RICHARD A. POSNER,
EcONoMac ANALYSIS OF LAW 160-65 (3d ed. 1986).
231. See CALABRsi, COSTS, sulra note 10, at 68-94.
232. Id. at 70-71.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 189-90.
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avoid losses by avoiding exposure to products to which they may be
abnormally vulnerable. 2
4
This vice, however, seems irrelevant to securities frauds in general and
to NPI trading in particular. These offenses consist of giving information
that the communicator knows to be false, and using information that is
not available to the public. Affected investors cannot, even by diligence,
protect themselves against these risks except by doing less investing. The
power to reduce the losses that result from NPI trading does not lie in the
hands of the potential victims, but in the hands of the traders, the tippers,
and the tippers' employers.
E. Costs of litigation
The most attractive advantage that might flow from excluding enterprise
liability in NPI trading suits is a reduction of expenditures on litigation. If
fewer employers are liable, the number of suits filed will probably diminish.
While litigation expenses fall, deterrence will also diminish, and the fre-
quency of violations and resulting losses will increase. Whether the deter-
rence of NPI trading by private suits is worth the costs that the suits
engender is a question that I will not attempt to answer here. It is, however,
a question that Congress answered affirmatively by ITSFEA's grant of an
express private right of suit and confirmation of preexisting rights of suit.
Enterprise liability is essential to the effectiveness of the rights of suit that
ITSFEA granted and confirmed.
Although rebuttable liability may reduce the number of suits, it seems
likely to increase litigation costs in the suits that persist. Under enterprise
liability the crucial question is whether the employee was acting within the
scope of employment or authority. This question calls for evidence of the
communications between the offender and the persons with whom the
offender dealt, which should be readily obtainable. Under rebuttable liabil-
ity, the question is whether the employer acted in good faith or induced
the violation. This query involves an inquiry into the minds of the employer's
executives and the whole train of communications and acquiescences within
the enterprise. Trials will involve volumes of evidence that will be as
voluminous and as inconclusive as the evidence of hypothetical transactions
that Justice Rehnquist decried in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drugstores.235
At one point in the hearings, an SEC communication suggested that
enterprise liability would lead to "meritless suits" against employers.?
6
Although this comment accompanied a draft law that would have made
employers liable in many more instances than does ITSFEA,237 it deserves
some consideration in relation to the eventual Act. The suggestion evidently
234. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis of
Products Liability, 14 J. LEGAL STruD. 535, 560-63 (1985).
235. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 743 (1975).
236. See supra note 122.
237. See supra note 184.
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referred to cases like that of Moss v. Morgan Stanley in the district court.2 8
There, Morgan's rep had used nonpublic information to tip a confederate
who was not a Morgan client. Morgan was subjected to a "meritless" suit,
which it defeated on the ground that Antoniou was acting outside the scope
of his employment and authority.
But not all suits against employers on account of NPI trading will be
meritless. In Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch,239 Merrill's rep had tipped a favored
client. Since the rep's nonpublic information had emanated from the security
issuer, Merrill and its rep were liable even before ITSFEA. But if in 1992
another rep, using nonpublic information of a takeover bid, tips a client
of Morgan, a different question will be presented. Under the SEC's bill,
Morgan would have been liable because it would have received a profit by
way of commission for tipping the client. But under ITSFEA Morgan will
not be liable if it can show good faith and noninducement. The inquiry
into Morgan's good faith and noninducment promises to be more complex
and expensive than an inquiry into the tipper's scope of employment. The
more unpredictable the outcome, the more the parties will spend on litiga-
tion.
F. Other forms of rebuttability
ITSFEA's exclusion of liability for employers who acted in good faith
and did not actually induce violations seems irreconcilable with any plausible
conception of the purposes of ITSFEA or of the Exchange Act, which
ITSFEA amended. One can hardly believe that legislators who voted for
ITSFEA were conscious of the significance of the exclusion.
But legislators, or at least some of them, may well have thought that
enterprise liability was too rigid a rule. The observation of the prosecutor
Giuliano, that "There should be a defense available for the firm that it has
... done everything it reasonably can do to avoid the problem," 24 is
plausible in relation to private suits, although it was probably directed by
its author to governmental enforcement actions. This formulation makes a
strong appeal to a sense of justice that is repelled by penalizing innocent
employers through enterprise liability.
A form of liability that comes close to Giuliano's prescription is
observable in the German law, which excuses the employer who "observes
the care required in the trade," and saddles the employer with proving the
defense.24 1 This standard is far more exacting than ITSFEA's provision for
private suits. 2 42 It is also more demanding than ITSFEA's provision for
enforcement actions, which not only excuses an employer who is not
238. See supra note 129.
239. See supra note 118.
240. Insider Trading, supra note 122, at 88.
241. See supra note 34.
242. Exchange Act § 20(a), incorporated by reference in Exchange Act § 20A(b)(3).
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intentional or reckless, but also relieves the employer of the burden of
proof.
243
If Congress were determined to exonerate the employer that has done
everything it can, it should consider adopting a formula like that of the
German law. But legislators should also ask whether litigation over the
vigor of the employer's efforts is likely to cost more in litigation expense
and in defeats of deserving plaintiffs than it saves by exonerating the truly
innocent. They should also consider the fact that leading German jurists
have recommended abandoning their rebuttability rule in favor of enterprise
liability.
244
VI. THE FuTuRE OF ENTm E'iS. LmBIIrrY
The conflict that existed before 1988 with regard to enterprise liability
was revived in new forms by ITSFEA. When suits for NPI trading are
filed, there will be disputes as to whether they can be sustained without
recourse to ITSFEA, where claimants can assert enterprise liability, or only
under ITSFEA, where they cannot.
More importantly, the disparity between liability under ITSFEA and
under other provisions of the Securities Acts may provoke a congressional
reexamination of the role of enterprise liability. On one hand, legislators
may not be satisfied to see brokerage firms defeating private suits on
grounds of mere good faith and noninducement, when they have failed to
maintain the procedures required by the Exchange Act. On the other hand,
a reversion to enterprise liability may be successfully resisted by the securities
industry, and alternative forms of rebuttable liability may replace the lax
rule of ITSFEA.
If the securities industry succeeds in excluding enterprise liability, other
regulated industries may contend for similar exoneration. The widely shared
revulsion against the rising tide of tort litigation24 may produce a critical
reexamination of enterprise liability. A return to the ancient rule of personal
fault liability for employers is hardly conceivable in the modern world, but
a switch to some form of rebuttable liability for employers is conceivable.2
Liability for harmful products is under attack, although the most visible
trend of current law is to expand it.247 But the antiliability movement has
243. Supra note 152.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42.
245. See COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, WHO SHOULD BE LIABLE? A GUIDE TO
POLICY DEALING wrrm RIsK (1989); PETER W. HUBER, LIALrY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND
ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988).
246. See Pitt & Kaufmanis, supra note 30, at 1647-52 (proposing to relieve employers of
liability when they prove that they have exercised due diligence in supervisions of employees).
247. See Symposium, Critical Issues in Tort Law Reform: A Search for Principles, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 459-818 (1985). Of particular interest are Priest, Enterprise Liability, supra note
10, and Epstein, supra note 222. Priest traced the development of product liability in a critical
tone. Epstein contended that product liability often displaces first-party loss insurance, which
would bear losses more efficiently.
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displayed little interest in attacking enterprise liability for wrongful acts of
employees. 248 Recent recommendations of industrial and governmental agen-
cies have included a raft of constrictions on liability, but eliminating
employers' liability for the torts of employees is not one of them. The
Committee for Economic Development recommended, among other things,
limitations of amounts of awards, making damages proportionate to share
of fault, and restricting liability for health and safety hazards to violations
of regulatory standards.2 9 The President's Council on Competitiveness
recommended, among other steps, taking punitive damage awards away
from juries and assessing costs of suits against losing parties.20 Peter Huber,
in his widely read Liability, complained of liability in unlimited amounts
for unforeseeable injuries,2' but not of making the employer compensate
the losses actually caused by employees' negligence.
If securities fraud is subject to the same dynamics as other torts,
eliminating enterprise liability is not a promising means of restraining
excesses. ITSFEA's limitation of damages to the offender's profit or loss
z2
is compatible with the recommendations made for other areas of compen-
sation, but eliminating enterprise liability from private suits would be a
bold step in a new direction.
In the absence of any significant economic or social analyses attacking
enterprise liability, Congress would be wise to delete from ITSFEA the
ambiguous clause that denies liability "solely by reason of employing."
Absent congressional action, federal courts would promote consistency in
securities law and consistency with other areas of tort law by adhering to
enterprise liability under the Securities Acts, and by disregarding the House
Committee's questionable announcement that ITSFEA excludes the principle
of respondeat superior.
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